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The papers in this special issue of the Journal of Comparative law on legal culture 
were first delivered at a workshop held in Venice University (Ca’ Foscari) 20-21 
May 2010. Special thanks go to Professor Renzo Cavalieri of the Departments of 
Legal Sciences and East Asian Studies (and his collaborators Georgio Colombo 
and Sara d’Attoma) for the wonderful organisation and hospitality that made this 
event so memorable. There were no complaints from participants even when the 
presentations had to be occasionally interrupted because of the serenading of 
tourists on the Grand Canal by the gondoliers passing in front of the picture 
windows of the meeting rooms. Professor Michael Palmer, Professor of Law and 
Associate Dean for Research & Global Development, STU School of Law, China 
and Professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of 
London, conceived and inspired the workshop and the special issue and has been 
closely and productively involved at every stage of its planning and production. 
It is only because he is also a General Editor of this Journal that he is not 
described as joint editor of this special issue.   
 
The term legal culture is widely and increasingly being used.1 But the 
relationship between use and usefulness needs to be teased out carefully. For 
                                                        
 
1
 There are chairs in legal culture in places as distant as the University of 
Girona in Spain, the university of Lappland in Finland and the university 
of Wuhan in china , Scandinavians seem especially interested in using the 
term, there is a  centre of legal culture in Copenhagen and a recent special 
issue of the journal by Retfaerd (the Nordic Journal of Law and Justice 
(Vol 31 2008 4/123) edited by Hanne Petersen was entitled ‘Legal 
cultures on the move’. There are also many examples of international 
collaboration which use this term. For example the five year project 
‘Legal Cultures in Transition – the Impact of European Integration’ ( 
involving researchers in England, Scotland and Norway and financed by 
the Norwegian Research Council) aimed ‘to provide ‘thick descriptions’ 
of legal cultures in three EU member states (Britain, Poland, Bulgaria), 
one EEA state (Norway) and one Near Neighbourhood state (Ukraine), in 
order to establish the extent to which legal cultures in Europe are 
converging. It will investigate legal culture and the contrasting 
perspectives of legal insiders and outsiders; the impact of religious 
traditions, the communist legacy, and the more recent ‘war on terror’ on 
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example, the idea is used differently by lawyers, politicians, citizens and (groups 
of) scholars. And it does not have the same meaning and resonance in different 
places -and different languages. It does not follow that because a term is used it 
is necessarily scientifically useful (The same could be said about a question-
begging term like legal system as compared to more careful uses of system 
theories).). Nor, on the other hand, does the argument that it is not useful for 
some purposes, for example for predicting the effects of legal transplants2, show 
that it has no uses at all. So what then is it good for?  
 
In her keynote address to the workshop Sally Merry tells us that ‘legal culture is 
a very productive concept, as well as a very incoherent one. It means many 
different things to different scholars. Perhaps this is why it is so useful.’ And 
Engel (in his response) agrees, suggesting that the heterogeneous group of 
contributors who have written for this special issue do at least have a shared 
sense that they have something in common to talk about. For its detractors, 
however, including the Benda – Beckmanns, it is this very polysemy that makes it 
inadvisable to use the term. They are especially worried by the way its reliance 
on the idea of culture oversimplifies explanations, because of its many meanings 
and tendency to lead to tautological swamps. But the issue is not just one of 
semantics.The Benda- Beckmanns do not define legal culture in ways that are 
very different from Merry. But whilst she advocates the continued use of the 
concept they call for it to be abandoned.  
 
The papers chosen here from those delivered at the workshop range widely, but 
they have been grouped together so as to underline their many important points 
of overlap. Sally Merry offers a thorough and incisive survey of what she calls 
‘the dimensions’ of legal culture. David Engel, in his reply, relates Merry’s 
approach to the more mainstream ideas of Lawrence Friedman, who first 
pioneered the use of the term. He raises important questions about the 
applicability of the term in  societies where law and religion are closely 
intertwined. The next paper by Franz and Keebet von Benda- Beckmann, 
appropriately entitled ‘why not legal culture’, focuses on the use of the term legal 
                                                                                                                                                              
legal culture; the impact of globalisation and intra-EU migration on legal 
culture; the interaction between legal culture and formal domestic law; 
and the interaction between legal culture and EU legislation.‘ 
 www.cmi.no/research/project/?1118=legal-cultures-in-transition.(   
checked November 20
th
 2011 
2
 See Gillespie, J. (2008) ‘Developing a decentred analysis of legal 
transfers’, in Penelope Nicholson and Sarah Biddulph (eds). Examining 
Practice, Interrogating Theory: Comparative Studies in Asia: Martinus 
Nijhoff : 25. The relationship between legal culture and legal transplants 
is not straightforward. On the one hand, scholars continue to look to the 
concept of legal culture to help them enquire into whether a legal 
transplants is likely to be successful (or why it worked- or more likely did 
not). But at the same time terms like legal culture play a role in debating 
whether transplants are even possible. 
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culture in situations of legal pluralism. They agree with Merry’s arguments about 
the need to adopt more dynamic approaches to the term culture. But, just for this 
reason, they conclude that there is nothing to be gained by putting together the 
elements (or dimensions) she collects in a category (or level) labelled  legal 
culture. The first section ends with a contribution by Tom Ginsburg who relates 
Lawrence Friedman’s idea of legal culture to his efforts to show the importance 
of social forces in shaping law, as opposed to the emphasis on a more internal 
legal approach characteristic of doctrinal approaches (and of much work in 
comparative law). 
 
Taking up Merry’s invitation to examine the ways legal culture is actively drawn 
on and constructed, the second section focuses on the micro dimensions of law’s 
engagement in everyday life rather than the more macro, aggregate, concept of 
legal culture. Susan Silbey and Debbie de Girolamo each provide rich case studies 
of the way people invoke law in situations of conflict and potential conflict. Marc 
Hertogh and Marina Kurkchiyan then go on to describe the results of their 
empirical research into public attitudes to national legal institutions over time 
and space. The last section moves to a more holistic conception of legal culture as 
a professionally administered set of laws and practices. Michael Palmer analyses 
and interprets the limits set by national legal culture to legal reforms for the 
protection of children in China and Sandra Hotz examines the extent to which 
women in Japan continue to suffer legal discrimination. But are national legal 
cultures monolithic? Stewart Field, in his careful comparison of youth justice in 
Italy and Wales, asks what gives coherence to the contrasting responses to youth 
crime in each jurisdiction. What about the fact that national legal cultures change 
over time? Osvaldo Saldias introduces the new concept of ‘legal culture light’ to 
account for the fact that legal institutions can be modified by ideas coming from 
elsewhere. In the final paper Yuksel Sezgin offers an insightful discussion of 
battles to change provisions governing women’s rights in Muslim religious legal 
systems in Egypt, Palestine and Nigeria. 
 
Is the same concept of legal culture being used in all these papers? Is it being 
used for the same purposes? In calling this workshop ‘using legal culture’ we 
certainly did not assume that we could avoid all discussion about how best to 
define the term. But the starting point of this collection is that the meaning of 
concepts depends in large part on the way that they are used. 3 Hence the aim 
was less to revisit these definitional debates and more to see what could be 
learnt from examining how scholars currently use this term in their research. As 
Kurkchiyan writes, in her contribution, ‘Although the potential of the concept to 
bring together the ‘legal’ and ‘social’ has been recognised at the theoretical level 
by specialists in comparative studies, its practical use in empirical research 
remains very poor’. Even the Benda- Beckmanns, who are most critical of the 
term, argue that ‘the main drawback of current discussion seems to be the lack of 
such a clearly defined set of problems for which the existing set of terms and 
                                                        
3
 Some of those authors who use the term mean nothing in particular with 
it, and some who do not use the term are essentially talking about the 
same issues. 
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concepts offer insufficient explanation and for which the term ‘legal culture’ 
might be a solution.’  
 
Legal culture remains a highly controversial term. Even Lawrence Friedman is 
now unsure if he should have invented it. He describes it as ‘an abstraction and a 
slippery one’ and admits that legal culture is ‘a troublesome concept’, that ‘there 
is a serious problem of definition’, and that if he were to start over he might not 
use it again. 4  Unfortunately he does not tell us how he would deal with the 
criticisms to which it has been exposed. It will be for the reader to decide how 
much progress has been made here in responding to the objections made by 
critics of the concept. The object of this introductory essay is to provide a 
background for and overview of the presentations given at the workshop. I shall 
first discuss the ways the concept of legal culture is defined and the purposes for 
which it may be employed. l then go on to reflect, in the light of these 
contributions, on some of the (interrelated) theoretical problems that are posed 
in the course of actually using the concept. 
 
What is legal culture? 
 
Studies of law in relation to culture cover a large range of topics including the 
role of culture- in -law (and the challenges of legal pluralism and 
multiculturalism) to the part played  by  law –as- culture seen as a way of making 
meaning. Those interested in the relationship between law and culture may wish 
to study law as a cultural artefact, examine the way it becomes present in 
everyday life and experience, or through the media, or consider the role of law in 
accommodating cultural defences or protecting cultural treasures5. But in the 
broadest sense, the gain in thinking about law in the same breath as culture is 
that it alerts us to cultural variation in how law is thought about and its ascribed 
and actual role in social life. The focus of the papers in this special issue is on the 
value of using legal culture as a ‘term of art’ for the purposes of comparative law. 
Amidst all the effort to reform the efficiency of legal institutions in developing 
countries, for example, few have stopped to consider that in many societies (and 
in all societies in at least some contexts) official law is mainly experienced as a 
source of unpredictability that threatens to disrupt everyday normative patterns 
and agreements. It is no wonder then that well meaning legal reforms often meet 
indifference or hostility. 
                                                        
 
4
 Friedman, L. (2006) ‘The Place of Legal Culture in the Sociology of 
Law’ in Freeman, M. (ed) Law and Sociology (Oxford University Press), 
185-199.  
5
 For  examples see Cotterrell, R. (2004) ‘Law in Culture’ 17 Ratio Juris 
1–14.; Kuhn, P. (1999) The Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructing legal 
scholarship (Chicago University Press); Mautner,M. (2011) ‘Three 
Approaches to Law and Culture’  96 Cornell Law Review, 839; Sarat, A. 
and Kearns T.R (eds), Law in Everyday Life (Ann Arbor, 1993) and Sarat 
A and Kearns, T.R  (eds), Law in the Domains of Culture (Ann Arbor, 
1998)." 
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But it is no small challenge to give this term of art a workable meaning .The word 
culture has been said to be the most complex in the English language6, and many 
law professors earn a living discussing the meaning of ‘legal’. Most often legal 
culture is simply taken to be the rough equivalent of ‘legal system’7 or a way of 
pointing to the specific techniques of exposition and interpretation employed by 
jurists and other legal actors8. As such it creates few problems of 
misunderstanding but also adds little to our conceptual armoury.It is also vital to 
distinguish amongst the different kinds of disagreements amongst those arguing 
about what legal culture means (or should be made to mean)9. There is for 
example the question whether or not legal culture is a useful term as compared 
to alternatives concepts. Then there is discussion about what the term refers to – 
for example, to attitudes and /or behaviour, or whether legal culture should be 
sought more at the popular or at the institutional level. Confusion can easily arise 
where what appears to be a debate about the correct interpretations of a given 
legal culture –say, the best explanation for why the Japanese make relatively 
little use of the courts, in fact trespasses into these other other areas. 
Blankenburg, for example, takes Friedman to be arguing that ‘folk’ culture shapes 
differences in legal behaviour. He offers, by contrast, a comparison of the very 
different use of courts in Germany and the Netherlands, countries which, he 
argues, have similar folk cultures. For him, institutional and infrastructural 
arrangements represent the key to differences in legal culture. In his view ‘there 
                                                        
6
 Williams, R. (1976/1983) Keywords, (Fontana/ Oxford University 
Press.) According to Wikipedia ( last checked nov. 6 2011)  the most 
common uses of the term culture (apart from referring to matters of taste) 
are to refer to ‘An integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief, and 
behaviour that depends upon the capacity for symbolic thought and social 
learning’, or ‘The set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that 
characterizes an institution.’ 
7
 See e.g. Gessner, V. Hoeland, A. and Varga, C. (eds.), (1996) European 
Legal Cultures (Dartmouth); and Varga, C. (1992) Comparative Legal 
Cultures (Dartmouth). 
8
 Blankenburg, E  and Rebuffa, G (1993) ‘Culture Juridique’ in Arnaud, 
A. (ed.), Dictionnaire encylopédique de théorie et de sociologie du droit ( 
LGDJ) 139–42. 
9
 Cotterrell, R. (1997) ‘The concept of Legal Culture’, in Nelken, D. 
Comparing Legal Cultures (Dartmouth). See generally Nelken, D. (1995) 
‘Disclosing/ Invoking Legal Culture' in Nelken, D. ed. Legal Culture, 
Diversity and Globalisation: special issue of Social and Legal Studies 4:4  
pp. 435-453; Nelken, D ‘Using the concept of legal culture’ in 29 
Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1-28; Nelken, D. (2006) 
‘Rethinking Legal Culture‘ in Freeman, M. ed. Law and Sociology, 
(Oxford University Press) 200-224. Nelken, D. (2007) 'Defining and 
using the concept of legal culture’, in  Orucu, E and  Nelken, D. (eds.)  
Comparative Law: A Handbook (Hart): 109-132. 
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is no legal culture outside of institutions’. 10 But, in the debate over whether the 
low level of use of law in Japan is to be attributed to deliberate cultural 
avoidance of litigation, or is rather a result of structural arrangements that block 
access to the courts, Blankenburg’s approach would line him up with those 
arguing that is structures and ‘institutions’ rather than legal culture that 
matters11.  
 
It is also not always easy to see where definitional disagreements end and 
empirical enquiries begin. Can we distinguish legal culture from political, 
economic or religious culture?12 How do they interrelate? Opinions may differ 
and in part at least this can (has to be?) formulated as an empirical question 
rather than as a matter of definition. Take Friedman’s distinction between 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ legal culture. Do lawyers belong to ‘internal legal culture‘ 
(as servants of the courts) or ‘external legal culture’ as agents of social groups 
and of individual litigants. What about the relationship between external legal 
culture and culture in general?13 Is external legal culture itself a distinctive 
aspect of wider culture? Is even internal legal culture distinguishable? What 
about the way judges incorporate lay definitions of appropriate behaviour into 
their activities?14 Or the examples offered by Silbey of laymen and women 
drawing on legal ideas in ordinary social life?  
 
There is also an important overlap between legal culture and what is called ‘the 
culture of legality’ (stressing the ‘legal’ before the word culture). This term- 
which corresponds very roughly to what in English is called ‘the rule of law’ is 
particularly common in those jurisdictions, or parts of jurisdictions e.g. in the 
former Soviet union, Latin America, or the south of Italy, where state rules are 
systematically avoided or evaded. These are places where there is -as seen from 
a state perspective -a culture of illegality. The point of talking of ‘legal culture’ in 
such cases is to point to the normative goal of getting ‘legality’ into the culture of 
everyday social and political life and so reorienting the behaviour of such 
                                                        
10
 Blankenburg, E. ( 1997) ‘Civil Litigation Rates as Indicators for Legal 
Culture’, in Nelken, D. (ed.) Comparing Legal Cultures (Dartmouth): 41–
68. 
11
See Nelken, D. ( 1997) ‘Puzzling out Legal Culture: A comment on 
Blankenburg' in Nelken, D. ed. Comparing Legal Cultures op.cit.  : 58-
88. 
12
 Brants, C and Field, S (2000) ‘Legal Culture, Political Cultures and 
Procedural Traditions: Towards a Comparative Interpretation of Covert 
and Proactive Policing in England and Wales and the Netherlands’, in  
Nelken, D. ed. Contrasting Criminal Justice (Aldershot): 77–116. 
13
 Banakar, R. and Fard, S.N. (2011) Driving Dangerously: Law, Culture 
and Driving Habits in Iran 
,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1871029. 201 
14
 see e.g. Edelman, L.B, Uggen, C. and Erlanger, H. S. (1999) ‘The 
Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational 
Myth’, American Journal of Sociology. 105: . 406-54  
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populations towards (state) law and /or encouraging state law to respect certain 
limits of action. Whereas legal culture is a descriptive/ explanatory term, the 
‘culture of legality’ is a normative and evaluative one. Keeping apart descriptive 
and normative meanings  is important, if only so as to be able to examine what 
sorts of legal culture are more or less conducive to creating ‘the culture of 
legality’.  
 
On the other hand, it is moot whether actual attempts to study legal culture can 
be (or should be) free of particular cultural or value -shaped ideas of what legal 
order requires. ‘Law’ and ‘culture’ are also words whose interpretation and 
deﬁnition have illocutionary eﬀects (‘this is the law’, ‘that behaviour is 
inconsistent with our culture’). The term ‘legal culture’ may itself be used by 
judges, politicians or others, in the course of making claims about what is or is 
not consonant with a given body of law, practices or ideals. This use, as much 
prescriptive as descriptive, or prescriptive through being descriptive, can ‘make’ 
the facts it purports to describe or explain. Some scholars therefore think the 
term must be crafted so as to capture what these legal actors are trying to do15. 
And the broader question arises whether any talk about culture can be merely 
descriptive rather than itself an interested intervention in debates.  
 
Culture as a term easily lends itself to misuse both by social actors and 
scholars16. It can be interpreted in a way that is ‘essentialist’, over- determined, 
over-bounded, and xenophobic. It can provide a reason to reject proposed 
reforms and an alibi for resistance to change. Many critics of the idea of legal 
culture see that term  as sharing in such problems. For Glenn, the idea of culture 
is suspect both because of its origins and its consequences. It came in, he claims, 
to replace the dirty work done by the idea of ‘race’ and the results of using such a 
term can be negative because it implies that patterns of behaviour and attitudes 
are static and necessarily doomed to conflict. He reminds us that cultures should 
not be treated as ‘super organic’, or ‘substantive, bounded entities’, but rather 
seen as ‘shreds and patches remaking themselves’.17 For Glenn, cultural 
analyses both unify and essentialise the notion of culture, so that scholars are 
tempted to orientalise behaviour as foreign and irrational and ignore or 
                                                        
15
 Webber, J. (2004) ’ Culture, Legal Culture, and Legal Reasoning: A 
Comment on Nelken’, in Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy: 25–3. 
16
 See Kuper, A. (1999)  Culture: The Anthropologist’s Account (Harvard 
University Press). But this can be taken too far, see Merry, S. E.   
‘Human Rights Law and the Demonization of Culture (And 
Anthropology Along the Way)’ in (2003) 26 (1) Polar: Political and 
Legal Anthropology Review 55–77. See also Goodale, M. (2009) 
Surrending to Utopia, (Stanford University Press)  for an anthropologist’s 
attempt to revive the use of the term culture in writing about  human 
rights.  
17
  Glenn, H. Patrick ‘Legal Cultures and Legal Traditions’, in: Van 
Hoeck. M. (ed.), (2004) Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative 
Law (Oxford University Press) 32.  
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downplay the importance of economic and related political drivers of change. 
The German word kultur indeed emerged as a defensive term to be used in 
romantic opposition to the French universalizing idea of civilisation (for which 
today’s discourses of democracy and human rights could be considered 
equivalents)18. Glenn insists further  that the term culture implies consensus.  
 
On the other hand, critiques such as Glenn’s seem to miss the point, at least as far 
as Friedman’s way of talking about culture is concerned. Friedman argues 
specifically that every group has its own legal culture, even going so far as to say 
that this is so for every individual. And his analytical distinction between 
‘external’ and ‘internal’ legal culture deliberately invites us to investigate the 
possibility of large differences between legal professionals and others. Curiously, 
Friedman’s use of the word culture in legal culture is in fact much closer to the 
non- essentalising French idea, as can be seen from his claim that we are moving 
to a global legal culture, based round individualism, equality, and human rights. 
Friedman stresses convergence and the role of modernity. As Ginsburg puts it,’ 
Japan is frequently deployed in Friedman’s favourite trope much law is the same 
in (for example) Tokyo as in Toledo or Turin. The statement has intuitive appeal 
because everyone ‘knows’ that Japanese culture is different and so assumes that 
legal culture must be as well. Yet scholars within Japanese studies are constantly 
fighting simplistic efforts to attribute differences in outcomes to cultural factors.’ 
 
Legal actors do (perhaps must?) work with some consensual idea of culture as a 
normative presupposition. But at this time of export and import of legal 
institutions and ideas it would be implausible indeed to see cultures as closed, 
uncontested and self-referential. The contributors to this special issue show 
themselves well aware of the dangers Glenn points to. Merry warns us that’ 
‘Cultural ideas are contested and connected to relations of power. Cultural 
repertoires include both values and practices, ideas and habits, and innovations 
along with commonsensical ways of doing things. Culture is the product of 
historical influences rather than evolutionary change.  It is marked by hybridity 
and creolization rather than uniformity or consistency. Local systems are 
embedded in national and transnational processes and particular historical 
trajectories.’ The Benda- Beckmanns agree and go further: ‘…we would have to 
ask what other factors would be highlighted and what might be displaced or 
silenced when we use the term ‘culture’ … the term ’culture’, like ‘custom’, 
threatens to silence, to make to make invisible, the categories of the legal and the 
political, the power differences and economic inequalities. ‘ 
 
Nonetheless, there are many other challenges which face those wishing to make 
use of the notion of legal culture. How is to be related to and contrasted with 
other aspects of society, for example institutional behaviour or social structure? 
If culture is defined too broadly nothing is left to be explained, if too narrowly it 
takes on a residual quality resorted to when other explanations run out. Should 
the term culture be reserved for irrational, or at least value- based action, rather 
than purely instrumental social action? If not, how else can we draw a line 
between culturally shaped behaviour and all other behaviour? Is legal culture a 
                                                        
18
 Kuper op. cit. 
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matter of attitudes and behaviour that is assumed or explicit, inarticulate or 
articulated?  
 
There are of course alternatives that avoid the difficult word culture. These 
include ideology19,community,20mentalities21, the legal complex22 
traditions23, epistemes, 24 formants25, path-dependency26, or even 
autopoiesis27. But is less clear that these other terms avoid the problems any 
better than legal culture when it comes to identifying what exactly they refer to, 
what makes them coherent objects of analysis and whether they end up as 
tautologies. They are also often used in ways that overlap with legal culture. In 
                                                        
19
 Cotterrell, 1997 op. cit.The Benda-Beckmanns agree with Cotterrell 
that ideology is a better term: ‘An approach that locates the cultural as a 
dimension of social organisation escapes this danger. Thus we would 
study the empirical manifestations of this dimension as they are 
expressed at different layers of social organization. At the layer of ideals 
and ideologies, we find generalized cultural understandings of why social 
life and organisation are as they are and how they should be and schemes 
have a strong justificatory and apologetic character. 
20
 Cotterrell , R (2006)  Law, Culture and society: Legal Ideas in the 
mirror of Social Theory ( Ashgate). 
21
 Merryman J.H. and Perez -Perdomo, R., (2007) 3
rd
 ed. The civil law 
tradition: Europe, Latin America, and East Asia (Stanford University 
Press). 
22
 Karpik, L. and Halliday T, ( 2011) ‘The Legal Complex’ , to be 
published in Annual Review of Law and Social Science, Center on Law 
and Globalization Research no 11-05, September, 15 2011. 
23
 Glenn, H. (2007 ) 3
rd
 ed. Legal traditions of world (Oxford University 
Press). 
24
 Legrand , P. (1997) Fragments on law as culture (Deventer). 
25
 Sacco R. (1991) ‘Legal Formants: A dynamic approach to comparative 
law ‘ Am. J. Comp. L.,  1-34. 
26
 See e.g. Pierson, P. (2000) ‘Increasing returns, path dependence and the 
study of politics‘, Am. Pol. Sc. Review 94: 251-267.; Mahoney J. (2000) 
‘Path dependence in Historical Sociology’, Theory and Society 29, 507-
548. 
27
 Gunther Teubner uses this theory to explain what can be said about the 
likely effects of trying to apply legal ideas across legal cultures see  
Teubner, G. (1998)  'Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How 
Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences', 61 Modern Law Review, 11-
32. And cf. ‘Beyond the Metaphor of Legal Transplants?: Consequences 
of Autopoietic Theory for the Study of Cross - Cultural Legal 
Adaptation', in Priban, J. and  Nelken, D.eds. Law's New Boundaries: The 
Consequences of Legal Autopoiesis,  Dartmouth, 2001: 265-302. 
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their contributions to this special issue Silbey shows that she is interested in 
ideological effects of doctrine even under the rubrics of legal culture and legal 
consciousness. Field tells us that ’the term culture brings it with certain useful 
resonant connotations that other terms like legal ideology or legal order or legal 
system do not: it ‘puts a great emphasis…on the lived texture of the social order’. 
But he also writes: ’Ultimately it is the tradition of the constitutionally 
independent and paternalist youth justice magistrate that provides the symbolic 
legal capital that lends coherence and stability to Italian youth justice cultures’ 
(my underlining). He adds that ‘if the concept of legal culture can help us to 
relate particular practices to the intellectual formations, institutions, traditions 
and structures of feeling that give them meaning we can make a significant step 
towards understanding the legal ‘other’ (my italics). 
 
Undoubtedly, some of the claims made for the superiority of other concepts also 
suffer from special pleading. Glenn argues that tradition is a widely used folk 
concept, whereas culture is used only in the West. But this begs the question of 
whether and when the terms of our explanations need always to be linked to 
those used by social actors. In general, many would argue that tradition also 
carries many of the troubling implications that Glenn attributes to culture. As 
Twining points out, it can be difficult to separate legal from other traditions. 
28The term has also been severely criticized for its neglect of socio-economic 
and political influences, as well as for committing the so called ‘intentionalist’ 
fallacy29. The concept of living law, for its part, only gets at part of what 
Friedman and others seek to explain with legal culture, nor does it lend itself 
easily for use in comparing legal systems. The concept of ideology is itself 
difficult to handle, not least because it requires us to justify our privileged 
position in describing other people’s ideas. The term is also not necessarily 
suitable for all the purposes of those who use legal culture; adopting this concept 
if anything would change the nature of the inquiry. As far as autopoiesis is 
concerned, whereas one of the purposes of using the term legal culture is to 
examine the how and the extent of internal legal culture’s autonomy, Luhmann’s 
theory resolves this by theoretical fiat.  
 
Working with the idea (s) of legal culture 
 
How we use legal culture will depend on thdisciplinary framework in which it is 
developed- and disputes between (as well as within) disciplines will shape what 
is made of it.30 In line with competing approaches to social theory, legal culture 
                                                        
28
 After summarising Glenn’s criticisms of the term culture Twining 
comments that for some purposes it may be useful nonetheless, see 
Twining, W. ‘Glenn on Tradition: An Overview’, Jcl 1. 1 107. 
29
 Whitman, J. ‘A simple story’; Review of P.Glenn’s Legal Traditions of 
the World, in Rechtsgeschichte, 2004. 
30
 Disciplinary allegiances also affect the answer to definitional issues 
about the boundaries of legal culture. In (USA- shaped) political science 
considerable energy has been expended in trying to establish how far 
judges are influenced by their political preferences.  
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can be seen as manifested through institutional behaviour, or as a factor shaping 
and shaped by divergences in individual legal consciousness, as a pattern of 
ideas which lie behind behaviour, or as another name for politico-legal discourse 
itself. Should we model legal culture on the idea of political culture with its focus 
on inquiries into voting patterns and types of political system, drawing a parallel 
between asking whether people go to vote and why do or do not use law? Or 
should we rather follow ‘rational choice’ theory, as developed in some political 
science or economists approaches,where’ culture’ often disappears in favour of 
other motivations. Whatever choice we make buys in to a larger set of theoretical 
ideas about law and society and related methodological protocols. Friedman has 
always employed the concept in the context of a wider theoretical approach 
based on an input -output model of social systems and a pluralist view of power. 
But the sense of the term will change if attempts are made to use it in the context 
of approaches such as those of Marx, Foucault, Bourdieu or Luhmann. 
 
Merry (in this volume) tells us that the meaning of legal culture varies in terms of 
at least three different academic traditions.31 And Saldias tells us that ‘there are 
as many possible components or elements of the concept “legal culture” as there 
are fields of research.’ Insofar as culture is shaped by the past historical 
approaches to legal culture must be important.32 But, according to Ginsburg (in 
this volume), Friedman developed his ideas in opposition to the mistaken ideas 
of ‘doctrinal lawyers and legal historians. The simple observation that legal 
culture reflects underlying social forces allows Friedman to emphasize 
surprising similarities that cut across the traditional ‘families’ of comparative 
law and this convincingly lays to rest the traditional comparativists’ idea that 
legal families provide much analytic bite in understanding contemporary 
societies… The term formed part of his battle to show that law was not insulated 
from and independent of social forces. So as to show that law is part of the 
totality of culture; that the part is not master of the whole; that interests and 
values, pressing in from outside or internalized by those inside the system, make 
up the law’.  
 
                                                        
31
 For her ‘One comes from the field of comparative law, which in the 
past studied legal families and traditions, examining how they develop 
and how they cluster together. A second is an anthropological focus on 
the way law expresses ideas and values that are shared within the larger 
society, both reflecting and creating these larger systems of thought and 
action. The third is a socio-legal perspective on the way legal institutions 
operate in practice. Clearly, these are quite different approaches to the 
concept, each with value in its own terms and yet suggesting different 
perspectives on legal change and comparison’. 
32
 For valuable and theoretically sophisticated examples of  socio- 
historical approaches see e.g. Channock, M. (2001) The making of South 
African legal culture, 1902-1936 : Fear, favour, and prejudice 
(Cambridge UP)  and Smail, D.L (2003) Emotions, Publicity, and Legal 
Culture in Marseille, 1264–1423, (Cornell University Press). 
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Marina Kurkchiyan sees the special value of the concept of legal culture in the 
way it can facilitate communication between the very different disciplines of law 
and social sciences. ‘At the ‘law’ end’, she tells us ‘are those who view the legal 
realm as a self-contained entity. Their work has produced a rich body of 
literature on courts, litigations and settlements, legal professionals, regulations, 
constitutions and human rights. At the other end are the ‘social’ scholars: people 
who try to go beyond the traditional, ‘jurisprudential’ concept of law and instead 
explore wider questions about the rules that people follow in their everyday life, 
the non-legal methods that they use to solve their disputes, their attitudes 
towards law, and their expectations of it.’ On the other hand, it is debatable how 
far law and social science can find a common language if their purposes differ. 33 
 
What is taken to be legal culture also varies with the methods used to grasp 
and/or measure it (and each method may miss something caught by the other). 
Friedman tells us that legal culture can be (indirectly) measured by asking 
people questions about how they think about the law or by watching what they 
do. 34 Comparative claims about legal culture may in fact need to rely on data 
and findings about patterns of which the participants themselves are unaware. 
For example, even well- informed people living in India mistakenly think that the 
reason courts are slow because the country has such a (relatively) high rate of 
litigation. 35 Americans are convinced that their Tort system regularly produces 
excessive and undeserved awards. But it turns out that in large part this 
impression is manufactured by the media.36 More generally, those societies 
where legal professionals express least concern for what Anglo-American 
writers since Roscoe Pound have called the ’gap’ or gulf  between the ‘law in 
books’ and ‘law in action’37, may not be those where the gap is least problematic 
but those where the gap is overwhelming. 
 
A wide variety of methods is represented in this collection. Merry argues that 
‘some aspects of the concept are more empirically accessible than others and 
warrant special attention’, and that each of the dimensions she identifies needs a 
                                                        
33
 See the exchange between Cotterrell, R. (1998) ‘Why must legal ideas 
be interpreted sociologically’ 25 Journal of Law and Society, 179-192 
and Nelken, D. (1998) 'Blinding Insights: The limits of a reflexive 
sociology of law' 25 Journal of Law and Society , 407-426.  
34
 Friedman, L. (1997) ‘The Concept of Legal Culture: A Reply’ in:  
Nelken, D. (ed.) (1997) Comparing Legal Cultures op.cit. 33–40. 
35
 Galanter, M. and Krishnan, J.K. (2003) ‘Debased Informalism: Lok 
adalats and legal rights in modern India’ in Jensen EG and Heller, TC 
(eds) (2003) Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the 
Rule of Law, 96-141. 
36
 Haltom, W and McCaan, M (2004) Distorting the Law, (Chicago 
University Press). 
37
 Pound, R.  (1910 ) 44 Law in Books and Law in Action, Am. L. Rev., 
12. 
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particular type of method. 38 For her ‘Legal consciousness and the practices and 
ideologies of legal institutions can be studied (both) with ethnographic and 
survey approaches’.The Benda-Beckmanns recommend in- depth ethnographic 
study of different sites, and De Gerolomo in fact provides an account based on 
direct observation. On the other hand, Saldias explains that the method of ‘thick 
description is unnecessary and inappropriate when studying ‘light’ legal culture, 
whilst Field tries to understand different ‘cultural logics’ even without 
undergoing full anthropological immersion. Hertogh relies mainly on opinion 
surveys (though he is critical of how they have been previously worded); both 
Engel and Field favour interviews whilst Kurkchiyan also makes use of focus 
groups. Palmer, Hotz and Sezgin, for their part, rely mainly on interpretations 
and readings of legal materials. Silbey, in her effort to get at laymen’s ideas of law 
relies largely on qualitative analysis of media sources. But she also suggests that 
‘the law operates, perhaps most powerfully, by rendering the world 
unproblematic. Indeed, in organizing and giving meaning to the most routine, 
everyday events -- such as buying groceries or driving down the street -- the law 
may be most present in its conspicuous absence.’ Hence, she argues, ‘we are 
more likely to observe it at those moments when the routine seems to break 
down. At moments when expectations are thwarted and tacit assumptions 
negated, people's actions often reveal what is usually their unarticulated 
understandings of the mundane; in short, that the taken-for-granted reveals 
itself in its breach’. 39  
 
All methods have their limits. Silbey admits that her reliance on the media makes 
it difficult to make quantitative claims and Hertogh admits that his findings need 
checking with more qualitative methods. Merry and the Benda-Beckmanns 
would perhaps want to know more about the social movements whose activities 
on behalf of the rights of women and children help explain what has and has not 
been achieved in those countries.) The prior choice of how we go about defining 
legal culture  (for example treating culture as either as the  conscious pursuit of 
given values or else as buried assumptions) should dictate the method chosen. 
But in practice- in these papers too- it may often happen the other way round. 
The use, say, of opinion surveys or analysis of legal texts implicitly determines 
the working definition of legal culture.  
 
Most important, however, different ways of using the term legal culture have to 
be understood against the background of well- established theoretical 
                                                        
38
 She tells us that ‘the first dimension requires organizational analysis 
and ethnographic study of legal institutions, the second a survey of public 
attitudes and perspectives, the third the analysis of recourse to legal 
remedies, and the fourth a study of how people conceive of problems and 
the relevance of the law to these conceptions.’ 
39
 Silbey writes , ‘the shoveler performs historic legal concepts of work 
and property and assumes that others organize their activities, in part, 
with these same notions. None of this need be articulated, either the legal 
concepts or the snow-shoveler’s assumptions that others think the same 
way that he does.’ 
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developments that distinguish two contrasting uses of the term culture40. In line 
with this contrast, one approach to legal culture would take it to refer to patterns 
of  law- related behaviour in given places or contexts (as contrasted with other 
time or places). Its aim would be to make comparisons of legal systems more 
sociologically meaningful and explain and  understand other (legal) cultures41. 
The second approach would see legal culture as an ongoing process of meaning- 
making playing a part in the shaping and reshaping of law. Work using this 
approach interrogates what is meant by culture as part of developing sociology 
and social theory of law more generally. This second definition thus overlaps 
with an interest in studying legal consciousness (as well as how to get ‘beyond 
legal consciousness’)42.The definitions of legal culture for each purpose are 
correspondingly different. An interest in comparing law- in – context-in different 
places for example would suggest including more in what is taken to be legal 
culture 43 than a domestic enquiry concerned to delineate the specific role of 
culture. 
 
Over the years Friedman has followed both tracks simultaneously. Some of his  
investigations have been geared to what he himself terms the first, 
‘anthropological’, definition of culture concerned with characterising ‘aggregates‘ 
of larger culture. Thus he has sought to characterise, for example, American legal 
culture – and the move there to what he describes as ‘total justice’ 44 or the 
‘republic of choice’ 45 as well as, more recently, Latin American legal culture.46 
                                                        
40
 See Swidler, A. 1986 Culture and Action: Symbols and Strategies. 
American Sociological Review 51:273-286, Sewell, WH Jr  (1999) ‘The 
Concept(s) of Culture,’ in Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in 
the Study of Society and Culture, eds. Bonnell, V.E and Hunt, L 
(University of California Press): 35-61. As Silbey has recently put it, ‘On 
the one hand we can speak of culture as a world of belief and practices 
associated to a specific group. On the other we can use the term 
analytically  as  a category distinguishing the cultural –‘ seen as a 
collection of semiotic resources deployed in interactions’- from other 
aspects of social life, Silbey, S. (2005) ’Legal Culture and Cultures of 
Legality’ in Hall, J.Grindstaff,L and Ming-cheng Lo eds. Handbook of 
Cultural Sociology, Routledge. 
41
 Nelken 2004 op.cit 
42
 Silbey, S (2001) ‘Legal culture and legal consciousness,’ in 
Encyclopaedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences, Elsevier; 
Silbey,S. (2005) op.cit. ‘After Legal Consciousness‘ Annu.Rev. 
Law.Soc.Sci : 323-368. 
43
 Nelken, 2004 op.cit.  
44
 Friedman, LM (1985) Total Justice (Russell Sage). 
45
 Friedman, LM (1990) The Republic of Choice: Law, Society and 
Culture (Harvard University Press). 
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But his own definition of legal culture, and his general use of the term to 
understand the demands people bring to law, clearly forms part of his attempt to 
show the influence of culture on law. In this volume some of the authors seem 
more interested in an overall characterisation of legal culture, for example, 
Palmer on Chinese legal culture in relation to the family, whilst others are more 
interested in the way culture is used and changed, for instance, Silbey in the 
creation of citizen-made law and De Gerolomo on the intersection between law 
and mediation 47.  
 
But can we draw on both these senses of culture in the same enquiry? 48Some 
critics argue that it would be safer to treat only the second type of enquiry as 
productive of knowledge and consider the first concern as merely indicating 
(one of) the objects about which such enquiry can be pursued.49 Taking the first 
concept seriously reproduces ‘essentialising’ assumptions about how law and 
culture related, reifying culture as determinant and constraining of individual 
choices. In this collection Merry warns against the first (holistic) use and argues 
that considering the constituent dimensions of legal culture separately provides 
far better insight into the law/society relationship, greater scope for agency, and 
a more nuanced analysis of processes of legal transfer, translation, and 
hybridity’. Others take the opposite view and insist that the first type of enquiry 
should have priority. Thus Legrand tells us ‘I understand the notion of "culture" 
to mean the framework of intangibles within which a community operates, 
which has normative force for this community (even though not completely and 
                                                                                                                                                              
46
Friedman, LM and Pérez-Perdomo, R (2003) Legal culture in the age of 
globalization: Latin America and Latin Europe (Stanford University 
Press)  
47
 De Gerolomo claims that ‘Mediation is hermaphroditic: the exploration 
of the term legal culture shows that mediation is outside the law as a 
social process, and at the same time, it is within the law through the 
influences of legal structures, rules and norms’. 
48
 As will be seen, the answer to this  question depends on the position 
taken on  a series of other theoretical choices, such as seeing culture as 
shaping or being shaped, pursuing or rejecting causal explanations in 
social science, and treating culture as found or made.  
49
 Nicholson, P. ‘Legal culture repacked: Drug trials in Vietnam’, in Nicholson, P. and 
 Biddulph, S. eds. Examining Practice, Interrogating Theory: Comparative Studies in 
Asia:  
Martinus Nijhoff : 71. 
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coherently instantiated), and which determines the identity of a community as 
community.’50 
 
The Benda -Beckmanns are those most opposed to continuing with the first use: 
‘Calling the values and beliefs embedded into legal repertoires and procedures 
‘legal culture’ comes close to capturing what comparative lawyers seek to 
compare … (b)ut this is rather different from what socio-legal scholars have been 
seeking to study under this heading, namely ‘the cluster of attitudes, ideas, 
expectations and values which people hold with regard to their legal system, 
legal institutions and legal rules’.51 Obviously, both people’s attitudes and values 
and the values inscribed into ideologies and legal frameworks are important, 
empirically and theoretically, but they are two different sets of social phenomena 
that have to be set apart and not be identified – people use culture depending on 
different contexts with each other. Only on this basis can possible 
interdependencies between them be analyzed.’ For them ‘It would be quite 
counterproductive to lump these factors into one concept of legal culture, as 
Friedman and others have proposed to do.’  
 
As I have argued elsewhere, however, there is a strong case for saying that the 
two enquiries are necessarily intertwined. Only in this way ‘research into legal 
culture (can) help alert us to the way aspects of law are themselves embedded in 
larger frameworks of social structure and culture that constitute and reveal the 
place of law in society’.52 Seen broadly, using legal culture can involve 
investigations that concern the extent to which law is party or state-directed 
(bottom up or top down), the role and importance of the judiciary, or the nature 
of legal education and legal training. It may concern ideas of what is meant by 
‘law’ (and what law is ‘for’), of where and how it is to be found (types of legal 
reasoning, the role of case law and precedent, of general clauses as compared to 
detailed drafting, of the place of law and fact). Legal culture can be discerned in 
different approaches to regulation, administration and dispute resolution. There 
may be important contrasts in the degree to which given controversies are 
subject to law, the role of other expertises, the part played by ‘alternatives’ to 
law, including not only arbitration and mediation but also the many 
‘infrastructural’ ways of discouraging or resolving disputes. 
 
It can often be helpful to start from what appear to be puzzling features of the 
role and the rule of law within a given society. Why do the UK and Denmark 
complain most about the imposition of  EU law but then turn out to be the 
                                                        
 
50
 Legrand 1997 (review of Nelken’s Comparing legal cultures in the 
Cambridge Law Journal 56 : 646-649. The lack of a contribution in this 
volume from Legrand is indeed the ‘elephant in the room’. Unfortunately  
his paper at the workshop was not suitable both because of its length and 
its somewhat different (but very interesting) focus .It will be published 
separately in the next issue of the journal . 
51
 See Friedman, L (1997) op.cit.  
52
 Nelken 2004 op.cit. 
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countries which have the best records of obedience? Conversely, why does Italy, 
whose public opinion is most in favour of Europe, have such a high rate of non 
compliance? Why does Holland, otherwise so similar, have such a low litigation 
rate compared to neighbouring Germany? Why in the United States and the UK 
does it often take a sex scandal to create official interest in doing something 
about corruption, whereas in Latin countries it takes a major corruption scandal 
to excite interest in marital unfaithfulness!? Such contrasts can lead us to 
reconsider broader theoretical issues in the study of law and society. How does 
the importance of 'enforcement' as an aspect of law vary in different societies? 
What can be learned, and what is likely to be obscured, by defining 'law' in terms 
of litigation rates? How do shame and guilt cultures condition the boundaries of 
law and in what ways does law help shape those self -same boundaries? 
 
For sociology of law to make progress in making claims about legal culture it can 
only do this if it gives careful consideration to its instantiation in both local 
national and international contexts. Silbey advocates ‘situated contextualised 
analyses of culture in given ‘sites of action’. But this cannot be abstracted from 
suppositions about the larger context. How far are Silbey’s findings applicable 
beyond the specific context of the three USA cities she examines?53. To what 
extent is the process De Gerolomo describes shaped by its setting in the UK- and 
specifically in London. Vice- versa, for the contributions that seek to generalise 
about national cultures such as Hertogh’s study of the Netherlands, Marina 
Kurkchiyan’s comparison of UK, Poland and Bulgaria, the discussions by Palmer 
and Hotz of the rules of family law in Japan or in China, and Field’s analysis of the 
response to juvenile crime in Italy or Wales.  
 
At the same time we must also bear in mind that possible uses of the term legal 
culture will change as ideas of culture itself come to be reformulated in 
anthropological or other work. Indeed part of the difficulty here arises from the 
fact that so -called ‘cultural turn’ (and an attendant stress on the creation of 
meaning) in the social sciences coincided with increasing reluctance to use the 
term ‘culture’ on the part of many anthropologists. It could be a fair criticism of 
Friedman’s pioneering approach to legal culture to say that it does not seem to 
have been influenced by the ‘interpretive turn’ in the social sciences. He seems 
unconcerned, as Glenn puts it, that ‘culture may be an effect of our descriptions, 
not its precondition’.54 As Jonathan Friedman has written, culture is now viewed 
as an endless interpretation of interpretations, part of an ‘enormous interplay of 
interpretations in and about a culture’ to which the scholar herself also 
contributes.55 
 
The unit of legal culture 
                                                        
53
 Merry tells us in her piece that there are some places and groups which 
take a quite ’un-American‘ attitude to resort to law. Of course they may 
see themselves as the ‘true Americans.’ 
54
 Glenn 2004 op.cit 
55
 Friedman, J. (1994), Cultural Identity and Global Process. London: 
Sage. 
 18 
 
What are we referring to when we speak of legal culture (or cultures)?56, high 
and low culture, ideal-types of community with different needs and uses of law, 
etc? Are national jurisdictions still the appropriate unit on which to focus? Above 
all there is the radical question that results from the fundamental debate over 
the meaning of culture. Is it a mistake to talk about legal cultures as objective 
units rather than as constructions of participants and  observers? Another type 
of criticism has to do with identifying the boundaries of legal culture with those 
of national jurisdictions. The search to understand and explain legal culture at 
the level of the nation -state continues to be an important ambition of 
comparative law and comparative sociology of law, as seen in titles such as the 
‘Japanese approach to law’,‘Dutch legal culture’,‘French criminal justice’ etc. Here 
too our contributors make reference to Chinese, Japanese, Bulgarian, Welsh and 
English legal culture. And the papers by Hertogh, Kurkchiyan, Field Palmer, and 
Holtz are concerned with explicating national units. But the student of legal 
culture will often want to focus at levels below and above that of the nation state 
On the one hand, the culture of the local courthouse, the working norms of 
diﬀerent social and interest groups and professional associations, the networks 
of individuals involved in pursuing, avoiding or mediating disputes. On the other, 
international institutions and regulators and the so-called ‘third cultures’ of 
inter-national trade, communication networks and other transnational 
processes57. 
 
In advance of empirical investigation it can be rash to assume any necessary 'fit' 
between law and its environing national society or culture. Legal systems have 
always been aﬀected by a variety of processes of borrowing, imitation and 
imposition. But increasingly nation states are (again) no longer the exclusive or 
even predominant source of norms. Their insertion in larger bilateral or 
multilateral structures and networks means that there is an increasingly wide 
gap between the (global) sites where issues arise and the places where they are 
managed (the nation-state). Different kinds of units emerge as objects and as 
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 Nelken, D, (2009) 'Law, Liability and Culture' in Engel, D. and 
McCann, M. eds. Fault Lines: Tort Law as Cultural Practice, (Stanford 
University Press): 10-24; Cotterrell, R. (2010) ‘Objectionable work: 
conscientious objection to Assigned work tasks: a comment on relations 
of law and culture’ 31 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 511. 
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 Dezalay, Y and  Garth, B (1996) Dealing in Virtue (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press).; Snyder, F (1999) 'Governing Economic Globalisation: 
Global Legal Pluralism and European Law' 5 European Law Journal, 
334-374; Teubner, G (1997) ‘Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the 
World Society', in Teubner, G. (ed) Global Law without a State 
(Dartmouth, Aldershot), 3-38; Teubner, G. (1998)  'Legal Irritants: Good 
Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences', 
61 Modern Law Review, 11-32. 
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agents of control. 58. Instead of governments, the talk now is increasingly of 
‘governance’ of how power is exercised at a series of other levels and by other 
institutions, in collaboration or otherwise with state bodies. The 
“denationalization” of rule making means that transnational public and semi-
public networks substitute, to an increasing extent, for national governments. 
Rule-formulation and settlement increasingly takes place within new agencies of 
transnational governance, such as NAFTA, the OECD, and the WTO, but also in 
many lesser-known public–private forums.  
 
Naturally, this process varies by different areas of legal and social regulation. A 
contrast is often made between, on the one hand, those areas of law that are 
relatively internationalized, such as international business contracts, antitrust 
and competition policy, internet and new technology, labour law, social law, and 
environment law, and, on the other hand, family law and property law. But 
experts even in these latter fields  frequently report evidence of international 
trends and cross-cultural influences. As the world is increasingly tied together by 
trade and communication many people increasingly have the sense of living in an 
interdependent global system marked by borrowing and lending across porous 
cultural boundaries which are saturated with inequality, power and domination. 
All this means that the purported uniformity, coherence or stability of given 
national cultures will often be no more than an ideological projection or 
rhetorical device used by some of those within or outside a given society or other 
context 59. So we need to avoid reifying national or other stereotypes and 
recognize that much that goes under the name of culture is no more than 
'imagined communities' or 'invented traditions'. We may also need to be cautious 
about using terms that suggest boundaries at a time when many argue that it 
would be more appropriate to speak of ‘flows’.60  
 
On the other hand, claims about the decline of the nation state can be taken too 
far. Diﬀerences between legal cultures may mobilize or reﬂect wider social and 
cultural patterns that roughly coincide with national political boundaries. Such 
                                                        
58
 Much of what is represented by the ‘rule of law’ itself, as a way of 
providing certainty and keeping the state within bounds, seems 
increasingly outdated for the regulation of international commercial 
exchange by computer between multinationals more powerful than many 
of the governments of the countries in which they trade, see Scheuerman, 
W.E. (1999),  'Globalization and the Fate of Law ', in Dyzenhaus,D. (ed), 
Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order, (John Hopkins 
Press), 243-266. 
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 Coombe, RJ  (2000)  'Contingent Articulations: a Critical Studies of 
Law', in Sarat, A. and  Kearns, T. (eds), Law in the Domains of Culture, 
op.cit. : 21-40. 
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Appudurai, A. (1995) Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of 
Globalization (University of Minnesota Press). Glenn 2004 op.cit. argues 
that, unlike culture, the concept of ‘tradition’ is less linked to the idea of 
spatial boundaries.  
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boundaries  often coincide with language and cultural differences and represent 
the source of common statistics. The imposition of a common legal code and the 
common training of legal officials form part of attempts to achieve and 
consolidate national identity. 'Borders' continue to play important instrumental 
and symbolic roles, not least in responding to immigration. It is therefore 
premature to say that the nation state has had its day as a source of ordering.The 
recent rise of punitiveness in many Western countries for example has been seen 
as an attempt by the state to reassert its sovereignty- either as a form of 
symbolical 'acting-out' or, alternatively, as an essential and successful aspect of  
restructuring the regulation of poverty by the neo- liberal penal state. There is 
even some empirical basis for psychological differences in national traits in the 
way people relate to each other.61 Such different, historically conditioned  
sensibilities may persist over quite long periods (But careful research is needed 
to  avoid confusing short-term and long- term trends.)  
  
The current so-called ‘globalisation’ of law is a complex process which is likely to 
produce increasing social and economic diﬀerentiation as much as harmony62. 
And ‘increasing homogenisation of social and cultural forms seems to be 
accompanied by a proliferation of claims to speciﬁc authenticities and 
identities’63. Hence assumptions of necessary convergence probably 
underestimate the continuing importance of culture and resistance. One of the 
most important tasks of the student of legal culture at the present time is in fact 
to try and capture how far globalization represents the attempted imposition of 
one particular legal culture on other societies. Importing countries are oﬀered 
both the Anglo-American model whose prestige is spread by trade and the 
media, and national versions of the more intellectually impressive continental 
legal systems embodied in ready-packaged codes. This model is said to be 
characterized by its emphasis on the link between law and the economy (rather 
than law and the state), by its reliance on legal procedures that prioritise orality, 
party initiative, and negotiation inside law. 64 More than any particular feature 
of legal procedure, what does seem to be spreading is the common law ideology 
of ‘pragmatic legal instrumentalism’, the very idea that law is something which 
does or should ‘work’, together with the claim that this is something which can 
or should be assessed in ways which are separable from wider political 
considerations. 
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 For examples from criminal law and criminal justice see Nelken, D 
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What is clear, however, at a minimum is that we now have to apply the term legal 
culture to a variety of different units, each of which is changing and in a 
relationship of mutual interaction with the others. But the problem with the 
term having a such a wide range of referents has been famously underlined by 
Roger Cotterrell in his critique of Lawrence Friedman’s use of the concept (a 
debate that also connects to the previous discussion of the two meanings of 
culture) .65The variety of ways that Friedman has used it  - as a term describing 
group or individual attitudes towards using law but also to ‘American legal 
culture’ and ‘modern legal culture’ has serious consequences for the value of the 
concept.  It means that legal culture becomes, in his words, ‘An immense, multi-
textured overlay of levels and regions of culture, varying in content, scope, and 
influence and in their relation to the institutions, practices and knowledge’s of 
state legal systems’. Although, he says, such a variety of level of super and sub 
national units could in theory provide a rich terrain for inquiry we must 
nonetheless reject the idea that legal culture can be reflected in ‘diversity and 
levels’ whilst also having a ‘unity’. For him, ‘if legal culture refers to so many 
levels and regions of culture (with the scope of each of these ultimately 
indeterminate because of the indeterminacy of the scope of the idea of legal 
culture itself) the problem of specifying how to use the concept as a theoretical 
component in comparative sociology for law remains’.66 
 
Cotterrell is right to argue that these units may often not add up to a ‘unity‘-– 
except from the point of view of those whose job it is to try to show them to be 
coherent. Merry too writes that ‘it is not clear how such a concept can deal with 
the extensive borrowing, transfer, and imposition of legal ideas and forms which 
takes place across the borders of legal fields.’ Rather than serving to show the 
concept to be otiose, however, this may be taken to testify to the intricacies of 
lived legal culture with its mix of overlapping and potentially competing 
elements (a complexity also encountered by those comparative lawyers who 
focus on societies with plural  legal orders.) 67 Saldias, in this special issue, 
argues that his notion of ‘light’ legal culture allows us to embrace this variety, so 
as to ask for example ‘if the ‘World Trade Organization has created a particular 
kind of legal culture that is different from a sheer notion of Lex Mercatoria; or 
whether the EU’s administrative legal composite can be considered a type of 
administrative legal culture.’ But even the papers on China and Japan take their 
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 Cotterrell, 1997 op.cit.  
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sense from the need to explain how these jurisdictions hold out against wider 
trends in family law (even when they have formally signed on to following them). 
 
Thus the extent to which cultural units maintain their (changing) boundaries 
largely reflects choices made by social actors. As Jonathan Webber argues ‘The 
concept of culture is not so much a way of identifying highly specified and tightly 
bounded units of analysis, then, as a heuristic device for suggesting how 
individual decision-making is conditioned by the language of normative 
discussion, the set of historical reference points, the range of solutions proposed 
in the past, the institutional norms taken for granted, given a particular context 
of repeated social interaction. The integrity of cultural explanations does not 
depend upon the “units” being exclusive, fully autonomous, or strictly bounded. 
Rather, it depends upon there being sufficient density of interaction to generate 
distinctive terms of evaluation and debate. When there is that density, any 
examination of decision-making in that context will want to take account of those 
terms’.68 
 
In his contribution here Sezgin extends this analysis.’ In each society’ he argues,’ 
there is a dominant legality (i.e. Legalist) drawn from the hegemonic legal 
culture that presupposes the supremacy and centrality of a single legal system 
and its ideology in the most positivist sense of the term (i.e., the state law). 
Dominant legality not only promotes a particular image and narrative of the law 
through channels of hegemonic legal culture, but also as a constitutive power it 
permeates into socio-legal space and colonizes bodies and minds of the subject 
of the law. However, the dominant legality is always challenged by alternative 
legalities that draw upon either deviant interpretations of the hegemonic legal 
culture itself or legal cultures of non-hegemonic subaltern groups.’ ‘One may 
observe,’ he argues, ‘competing legalities within the same socio-legal space each 
drawn from a different strain of legal culture. Individuals and groups can invoke 
legality in ways neither approved nor acknowledged by the “law”. In fact, as 
repeatedly shown in social movements and legal mobilization literature, it is 
possible for groups to invoke legalities that are in stark contradiction to the 
essence and spirit of the law.‘ (and see also Silbey’s chapter) 
 
Elements and Aggregates 
 
A problem closely linked to the task of identifying the unit(s) of legal culture is 
that of distinguishing the elements of (legal) culture as opposed to treating it as 
an aggregate. Glenn tells us that what he finds particularly problematical is the 
employment of culture as a ‘holistic signifier’ and also as a ‘variable‘ (a confusion 
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of the two main uses of the term culture) .69 As Ginsburg reminds us, in fact 
Friedman regularly treats legal culture as an aggregate characterised by a variety 
of elements or traits, 70 but also uses legal culture as an analytic device, 
distinguishing ‘internal’ legal culture, which refers to the role in the law of legal 
professionals, from ‘external’ legal culture which he uses to refer especially to 
those individuals or groups who bring pressure to bear on the law to produce 
social change. But the distinction between aggregates and elements is not a hard 
and fast one. All wholes can be incorporated into yet larger ones, just as all 
elements can be broken into yet smaller ones.71 Whether it is appropriate to go 
down or up in levels of abstraction will depend on the purpose of an enquiry, for 
example whether we are comparing whole societies are elements within them 
(see also the paper by Saldias).The group ‘attitudes’ towards the use of law that 
are at the centre of Friedman's use of legal culture can also be broken down into 
smaller elements. Indeed Friedman thinks it is plausible to speak of each 
individual’s legal culture. And these individual attitudes or opinions are in turn 
themselves composed of measurable responses to a range of particular 
questions.  
 
Merry’s address is centrally concerned with this issue. She argues that we need 
to break up the idea of legal culture into what she calls four ’social dimensions’. 
The first is the practices and ideologies within the legal system, everyday way of 
getting things done, shared assumptions about good and bad clients, and other 
internal rules and practices, some of which are based on legal doctrine and 
others on categorizations shared by the wider society, such as ideas of race and 
gender. (As she says, this corresponds to Friedman term ‘internal legal culture). 
Then there is the public’s attitude toward the law. Whether the legal system is 
seen as a source of corruption and ethnic preference, for example, or it may be 
viewed as an institution that offers the rule of law for all people equally, 
regardless of their background. This, she suggests, is somewhat similar to what 
Friedman calls external legal culture. Thirdly, there is the question of legal 
mobilisation, which refers to how readily people define their problems in legal 
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terms, when they turn to the law for help72.A fourth dimension is legal 
consciousness, the extent to which an individual sees him or herself as 
embedded in the law and entitled to its protections. Experience with the law, 
both good and bad, can change legal consciousness. It may encourage further use 
or may drive the litigant to avoid the law next time.  Merry argues that these last 
two aspects offer the best way to understand the cultural dimensions of law and 
its relationship to a social context as well as providing a more satisfactory 
analysis of the processes of translation across legal fields and the hybridity of 
these fields. She emphasises that these are dimensions  rather than distinct 
forms of social behaviour.73 
 
Merry sees this programme as the best way of facilitating empirical research into 
legal culture By contrast, the Benda- Beckmanns see the need to distinguish legal 
culture into its elements as a reason to jettison the larger term altogether. For 
them ’there can be no doubt that the concept summarizes important social 
phenomena. The question is whether it makes sense to capture them in one 
analytical concept and treat them as one unit for purposes of description, 
comparison and social theory’. They admit that most authors are well aware of 
the fact that there is no homogeneity in what they call ‘legal culture’ and tend to 
be careful enough to differentiate among the components of the whole. However, 
for them ‘such differentiation is marred by the original conception of what they 
make distinctions in, namely ‘legal culture’. ‘Once legal culture is disassembled,’ 
they claim’ it becomes difficult to reconstruct it as an analytical category. The 
study of ‘empirical complexity and the interdependencies of its components will 
not become easier if captured as ‘legal culture’. ‘If the term refers to attitudes, 
knowledge, expectations and values,’ they ask ‘why not talk about attitudes, 
knowledge, expectations and values? If it refers to ideologies or to the values 
embedded in law, why not call them thus? These concepts are general enough. 
Lumping too many things together into ‘legal culture’ or into ‘units’ of legal 
culture easily obscures interrelations between the elements that are lumped 
together.  
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Interestingly, however, they acknowledge that their way of talking about legal 
culture sometimes comes close to Friedman’s analytical distinction between the 
elements of internal and external legal culture. Thus they tell us ‘Individual 
persons have their own knowledge, values, and attitudes towards law and its 
operation (in the sense of Friedman’s ‘legal culture’). These are usually a 
combination of knowledge, stereotypes and ideas shared with many others with 
highly idiosyncratic values and attitudes based a person’s socialization and 
experience. These may be similar or different from those values inscribed into 
ideologies and the legal-institutional framework.‘  They then insist (in words 
from which Friedman would probably not dissent) that ’the extent to which 
interactions, including the ways the institutions of a legal organisation function 
and the ways in which persons or organisations use the legal system, are 
influenced by such personal cultural understandings is a theoretically important 
issue, but the personal understandings should not be identified with those 
inscribed into ideologies and legal frameworks.’ 
 
In any case, most people who participated at this workshop were not so ready to 
jettison the idea of legal culture, even as they wrestled with the challenge posed 
by the Benda-Beckmanns. Stewart Field, for example, asks, ‘what is the 
advantage of labelling that general representation as one of legal cultures rather 
than (say) legal orders, systems or processes?’ His answer is ‘the apparently 
paradoxical notion that one differentiates formations, institutions, structures of 
feeling and traditions to enable the making of necessary connections between 
them.‘ As he puts it ‘ actors do not live in a world of differentiated elements of 
institutions, formations, structures of feeling and traditions, however useful the 
distinctions may be as a heuristic device. The ultimate and impossible challenge 
that legal anthropologists and comparative lawyers must set themselves is to try 
to get something of the subjective feel of the normative pressures operating on 
the legal ‘other’ while making those pressures explicit in a way that native legal 
actors would not and perhaps could not do.’   
 
Field tells us, more generally, that he was unhappy with breaking legal culture up 
into its constituent elements because ‘(T)hey seemed to hold separate what I 
wanted to bring together: the active relationships between legal (and other) 
frames of interpretation on the one hand, and institutional and doctrinal 
practices around the law on the other.’ He favours instead an approach in which  
culture is treated as ‘the process of interaction between patterns learned and 
created in the mind and patterns communicated and made active in 
relationships, conventions and institutions.’ He seeks to show ‘that the 
interpretation of a wide range of operative legal concepts is shaped by distinct 
social connotations, that these practices only ‘make sense’ within particular sets 
of legal and broader social contexts and relationships. No doubt these meanings 
are fragile and contested and subject to change. But the argument is that there 
are distinctive cultural ‘logics’ at work, distinct ways of seeing  into which the 
researcher must struggle to enter. ‘ 
 
Marina Kurkchiyan, likewise, is reluctant to abandon the whole for its parts. ‘The 
concept of legal culture,’ she says, ‘becomes a useful orientating notion if the task 
is to identify a pattern of constructing a meaning of law and behaviour towards it 
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throughout the society, a pattern that emerges as a result of interplay of the legal 
and political traditions with the contemporary institutional configuration, as 
well as impact of external influences. It provides the broad vision that permits an 
assessment of what law is in that particular setting, how it works, and how it 
relates to other social constructs such as trust, justice, power, and group socio-
legal identity.’  Referring to the first use of the term, she admits, however, that 
’difficulties emerge when a researcher uses the holistic method to compare 
different societies.’ ‘In that task,’ she argues,’ a new set of questions has to be 
addressed.’  
 
In explaining the sense of her own enquiry she tells us that ’In different societies, 
each with its local peculiarities, law and legal institutions are likely to have 
evolved in contrasting directions. The inevitable sequence of historical 
serendipities is likely to amplify the differences. Logically one would expect law 
and legal institutions to convey different messages to the people in each of them. 
Would not each set of people, as users of legal institutions, define and re-define 
the substance of those institutions through their distinctive beliefs, experiences 
and practices? And would not the particular configuration and performance of 
other institutions in the society (economic, social, and political) influence the 
role and interpretation of what law is perceived to be in that particular social 
setting? She concludes recommending ‘the potential of the idea of a single “legal 
culture” to explore the way in which law is constructed in a particular social 
space through the interaction of all the relevant social forces, internal as well as 
external, so that together they constitute a complete map of what is traditionally 
called the legal sphere.' 
 
As these interventions suggest, the question of when to  disassemble the idea of 
legal culture will again depend largely on the purpose of our research. In his 
paper Saldias sets out to study how legal culture actually breaks down as it 
‘travels’ from one society to another. This offers a new way of examining the 
relationship between the whole and its parts. ‘Certainly’, he tells, ‘the “thick 
description” project is a very fruitful one: it prevents the analysis of legal 
systems from getting oversimplified. It has however severe limitations. First, 
since it pursues a comprehensive account of legal culture, it gives up stringency 
in its assertions. As it aims at incorporating every relevant element of legal 
culture, it looses the systematic overview of its different elements. At this point, 
we hardly know how and to what extent the many components of legal culture 
have intertwined’. So he recommends that we ‘deliberately exclude some 
elements of legal culture – insofar as this helps explain why modified versions of 
legal culture are able to ‘travel’. This so called  ‘light’ version of legal culture is 
seen as ‘a process that encompasses only attitudes, beliefs and a common 
language, deliberately leaving behind others like history and values.’ 
 
Circular Explanations?  
 
 
What role can legal culture play in ‘explaining’ patterns of legally related 
attitudes and behaviour? And how does this relate to the difficulties we have 
already noted with respect to identifying the units or needing to distinguish the 
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elements from the whole of which they form part? For many critics this is the 
central problem with the term because confusion of cause and consequence is 
intrinsic to all explanations using the idea of culture. It is too easy to fall into the 
trap of ‘essentialism’ or ‘culturalism’ which involve circular arguments in 
showing how cultural values cause a given response to events. Question: Why do 
they use law that way in Japan? Answer: Because that is their (legal) culture. Or 
to put the point another way; when we talk about American or Japanese legal 
culture are we already offering some sort of explanation of behaviour or only 
indicating that which needs to be explained? Is legal culture the name of the 
question or the answer? 
 
As we have seen, Cotterrell sees this problem as one posed especially acutely by 
the range of referents for legal culture in the work of Friedman. He complains 
that ‘Friedman sees legal culture as a cause of ‘legal dynamics’, though, 
somewhat confusingly, he also uses it to describe the results of such causes, 
writing for example, about the traits of a variety of large aggregates such as 
American culture, Latin American legal culture, modern legal culture and even 
global legal culture74. In his reply to these criticisms Friedman seems to miss 
this point and takes him to be complaining mainly about the difficulty of 
measuring the concept. To this Friedman replies that many other concepts are 
similarly ‘abstract’;  differences and changes in culture can be measured through 
indirect indicators such as crime and litigation rates.75  
 
But even if Friedman does indeed use the term to denote aggregates as well as 
elements this does not mean that his own use of legal culture in his explanatory 
enquiries are tautologous, Typically, he wants to show how social, political and 
technological developments produces change in what people expect of the law.  
As Ginsburg reminds us, the argument goes, the rise, for example, of a society 
based on the automobile produces new demands (legal culture). This then 
creates the need for new rules, changes which rules are important and the 
problems to which legal institutions seek to offer responses. Certainly, as 
Ginsburg goes on to concede, this raises the question ‘whether modern law is 
‘the cause’ or ‘product’ of other social developments’. But Friedman’s answer is 
that it is social forces or social structures – as set into motion by social groups 
and individuals (i.e. ‘external legal culture’)- that are the actual agents of 
change.This said,  it is also entirely plausible to argue that  what is a cause can 
also be the result of other causes. Recently, Friedman has described how modern 
social and economic developments have led to the growth of a culture of 
‘expressive individualism’ that has helped spread the idea of universal human 
rights. This has weakened the pretensions of national sovereignty which in turn 
helps the spread of transnational prescriptions. 76 
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But it is not only Friedman’s work that has come in for this type of criticism. Sally 
Kenny has made the same kind of objection when reviewing the second edition 
of Blankenburg and Bruinsma’s book Dutch Legal Culture77. She first 
summarizes what they have to say about legal culture as an aggregate: 
‘The Dutch legal culture is pragmatic and flexible, rather than rigid and 
formalistic. It favours consensus, inclusion, discussion, and negotiation (if only 
among all relevant elites) rather than conflict and dichotomous, legally-
enforceable outcomes. The absence of judicial review of legislation coexists with 
wide judicial, administrative, and prosecutorial discretion. The Europeanization 
of legal practices, greater public concern about crime, and a reduced willingness 
to fund a generous welfare state, however, are eroding the distinctive aspects of 
Dutch legal culture.’  
 
But she then goes on to voice her misgivings about asking an aggregate to play 
the role of a variable. ‘I agree that legal culture is not reducible merely to public 
opinion or attitudes of legal professionals. Institutions both reflect the broader 
culture and shape it. Institutions and legal culture are, as we say, mutually 
constitutive. But, she complains, this way of using the term means that ‘legal 
culture has that slippery “residual variable” quality about it—shared by the 
concept political culture. It is everything and nothing simultaneously. It is the 
totality of laws, practices, and opinions. And it somehow simultaneously stands 
apart from these things and effects how they work. It is both cause and effect’.78 
 
It is easy to find other examples of the same criticism. Glenn argues that legal 
culture’s ‘shortcomings come into evidence when it shifts from something to be 
described, interpreted, even perhaps explained, and is treated instead as a 
source of explanation in itself’.79 Jeremy Webber agrees, ‘Until a solution is 
found to this problem, legal culture ‘risks being a superficially attractive but 
ultimately obfuscating concept, insisting upon interdependency but then 
cloaking that interdependency under the rubric of a single concept, doing 
nothing to tease out the specific relations of cause and effect within any social 
field’. Consequently, alternative terms to legal culture will be that much more 
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attractive to the degree that they can be shown to be less likely to lead to circular 
arguments in which the explanation is also that which needs to be explained.’80  
 
But Webber also implies that, in theory, it would be worthwhile to tease out 
‘specific relations of cause and effect’. And there are many possible causal 
hypotheses that could be productively explored. Most obviously, when social 
actors take ‘culture’ to represent or require certain behaviour or values they 
make orient themselves to it as  a reason for acting. As Palmer points out in the 
citation which serves as the head note to his paper “Anyone who has ever asked 
… Chinese informants why they follow such and such a custom knows the 
maddingly reiterated answer: ‘Because we are Chinese’ ”.This can also affect the 
operations of larger units. In the 1980’s the appearance of league tables of 
relative levels of incarceration induced Finland (interested in being seen as 
similar to other Scandinavian countries) to move towards the average 
imprisonment rate by reducing its prison population; Holland for its part felt 
enabled to do the opposite. Likewise, how far East European cultures come to 
resemble western legal cultures, assuming this to be desirable, in part depends 
on how far politicians, policy makers and legal actors there believe they can 
escape the patterns inherited from the past. 81  
 
Interestingly, the Benda- Beckmanns, despite their generally critical approach to 
the term, do not see tautology as the real problem here.  The important thing for 
them is to dissolve culture into the stream of social interaction. ‘The threat of 
‘tautology’ ‘, they tell us, ‘only arises out of a static understanding of ‘legal 
culture’. … the question of whether ‘legal culture’ is something that explains or 
that has to be explained, now does not present a problem. …whatever is 
summarised as culture or legal culture will be the context, medium and outcome 
of social interactions. Disaggregated and set into a structuration perspective, the 
various elements captured under ‘legal culture’ may be used to explain other 
elements. Different elements of ‘legal culture’ may figure as objects and 
description or figure as factors in explanation. One can only speak of ‘tautology’ 
if one treated these different social phenomena as ‘the same’ phenomena and 
disregarded the chronology and logic of processes of structuration.’ 
 
Another way of avoiding tautology is to see legal culture as something that needs 
to be explained rather than as an explanation.82 This may be what Friedman is 
doing when he argues that ‘social forces’ cause legal change – calling those forces 
external legal culture is just an unfortunate turn of phrase. Repeatedly he has 
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sought to prove that it is social conditions that make legal interventions effective 
not vice versa. In this collection too we also find attention given to explaining 
(changes in) legal consciousness rather than using it as itself an explanation of 
socio-legal change. Thus Hertogh tries to chart the declining legitimacy of law in 
the Netherlands by showing the need to examine how people support legal 
institutions, not just how much. But at the level of an entire society almost 
anything may turn out to be relevant to explaining why its legal culture, or even 
just one aspect of it, differs from another’s.  
 
Take, for example, the question why Italy suffers such long court delays. To 
answer that this is because of its legal culture is  tautologuous if delay is itself 
included as one of the ingredients of its legal culture. But if we seek to explain 
such delays- as a feature of legal culture we can certainly find a long list of 
potential factors. In the first place there are the relevant laws, especially those to 
do with civil and criminal procedure. There is also the management and 
organisation (or lack of organisation) of the courts and legal profession, claims 
about the supply of law not keeping pace with the demand, economic interests, 
political priorities etc. On the other hand there is the effort of the European 
Court of human rights to create pressure for the Italian legal system to come into 
line and the way this is frustrated. 83  
 
The problem of course is that it can then prove surprisingly difficult to decide 
which of these factors are the crucial ones, especially as the relevant facts can 
often be elusive (e.g. comparative statistics suggest that Italy has a comparatively 
low rate of litigation despite the continual complaint about court overload )84. 
Interpretations of these facts can be even more controversial. Large companies 
can make use of judges as (paid) arbitrators outside the normal trial system. But 
small businessmen (the backbone of economic life in Italy) would seem to gain 
little from the current situation. If so why do they not put more pressure on the 
politicians to do something? Are lawyers and banks the only ones that profit 
from this situation? 85 Here rather than culture providing pat solutions to our 
enquiry it leads (as perhaps is appropriate?) rather to an infinite regress of 
causal puzzles regarding what shapes it.  
 
 
Using the idea of legal culture when studying the relationship between law and 
different social contexts is less likely to produce results that are tautological if 
we are open to new evidence that can lead to revising our understanding of the 
culture in question. Take for example the problem of explaining why Italy has – 
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allegedly- a good record in applying the recent international agreements aimed 
at fighting human trafficking and helping those who are victims of it.86 At a 
conference held in Palermo to celebrate the signing of the so-called Palermo 
Protocol some years earlier a number of speakers argued that Italy was one of 
the countries that was most advanced in interpreting and applying it. By 
contrast, they claimed, places with the reputation of being progressive in matters 
such as women's rights, such as Sweden or Netherlands, had a much poorer 
record.  
 
Such claims are surprising given that other aspects of what we know about 
Italian legal culture might have predicted a quite different outcome. Not only 
because Italy is often slow in complying with other  international directives, but 
also because Italy's criminal justice system is not very victim - oriented, and its 
victim- support movement is not anything like as well- developed as in many 
other advanced western countries. In Italy, partly as a result of the influence of 
Catholic culture, victims are often expected 'to forgive' rather than ask for 
revenge. As a 'state society', punishing is considered something to be carried out 
for the 'general interest' not on behalf of victims In many Protestant countries, 
with a 'liberal' idea of the state, by contrast, victims are often put on a pedestal as 
representatives of the 'community' for whose defence - as potential or actual 
victims- the state/ government justifies its existence. 
 
Of course it could simply be untrue that Italy is really more active in applying the 
Protocol than other countries. Because of the lack of comparable cross- national 
data on the number of cases dealt with in relation to the number of potential 
cases of trafficking, we cannot be sure how Italy's figures compare with those 
elsewhere. Or we may not be comparing like with like in terms of the potential 
number of victims that could be helped. There are a number of reasons why the 
number of people trafficked to Italy -itself a function of the number of illegal 
migrants- could be much larger than in many comparable countries. First of all 
there is the power exercised by four major entrenched organised crime groups. 
Then there is its geographical position, with an exposed coastline and proximity 
to Africa, and the large poorly regulated black economy and demand for illegal 
workers - in the agricultural, industrial sectors and sex trades.  
 
If these factors mean that Italy has a relatively high number of cases of trafficked 
victims then it would be no surprise (and not a mark of merit) if Italy has more 
opportunity to apply the Protocol. Conversely, if what we are measuring is 
activity more broadly geared to prevention and protection of immigrants or of 
those in the sex trade the relatively small number of cases of trafficking victims 
protected in Sweden and the Netherlands is open to a different interpretation. 
Sweden deals with few cases because it relies instead on prosecuting prostitutes' 
clients. The Netherlands, by contrast, seeks to legalise and regulating the trade in 
sex so as to curb the demand for trafficked victims. By contrast, the Italian 
response to trafficked victims has done little to help introduce more 'rational' 
ways of regulating immigration or sex work generally. 
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It would be wrong, however, just to 'explain away' claims that Italy is especially 
effective in dealing with trafficking cases. After all, the fact that the protocol was 
signed in Palermo (as well as the presence of a number of relevant 
intergovernmental and NGO groups on its territory) may have given Italy some 
sense of 'ownership' of this struggle. Because there is more organised crime in 
Italy than in many other European countries this means that the criminal justice 
system has had more experience in dealing with it. Concern for victims may have 
increasingly become the justification for the application of the criminal law in  
countries whose legal cultures are more influenced by liberal individualism, 
Protestantism and the common law. But this may work differently when it comes 
to foreign victims of trafficking who are not members of the local ‘community’ 
and may be considered to some extent authors of their own plight. Italy, by 
contrast, is a country with a relatively higher tolerance for ambiguity when 
deciding who is a victim (as with the so called organised crime pentiti.) It may be 
precisely because the justification for punishment does not flow from the ‘ ideal’ 
victim that there may be more willingness to protect flawed victims.  
 
Other more general, debatable and debated features of Italian legal culture could 
also be relevant here. The degree of independence from government enjoyed by 
judges and prosecutors in Italy can cause problems in coordinating crime policy- 
and, according to their opponents, contributes to political instability. But 
because judges often find that they have to substitute for politicians in dealing 
with endemic social problems such as corruption (their so-called role of 
supplenza or supplement) this gives them more of a free hand than in some 
other jurisdictions. Thus judges and prosecutors can extend protection to these 
particular victims even if this may not be very popular with governments or 
public opinion- who are usually keener on cracking down on anything connected 
to illegal immigration. What is a disadvantage in one setting can be a plus in 
another. For example, if, as we have noted, Italian legal procedures are 
particularly afflicted by delays this may make it all the easier to allow for decent 
'cooling off periods' so that victims of trafficking can overcome their trauma and 
decide what they want to do next. In sum, the main reason to speak about culture 
- and not just economics and politics - is to see how legal ways of dealing with 
problems tend to 'come as a package'. 
 
Explanation or Interpretation? 
 
The danger of tautology is most worrying to those with an interest in prediction 
who hope to develop policy relevant social science explanations showing how 
variables produce outcomes. What legal factors correlate with economic growth? 
Which conditions are likely to determine whether this transplant takes or 
not?87But comparativists may want to use the idea of legal culture for a variety 
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of other purposes including classification, description and evaluation. And it is 
important not to identify explanation merely with the use of causal analysis.88 
For Pierre Legrand ‘the comparatist is attracted to the explicatory power which 
an appreciation of the legal as culturally constituted may yield. The 
indeterminacy of "culture" or, if you will, the impossibility of distinguishing 
between "culture" and "non-culture" in a way that would allow the identification 
of empirically verifiable causal relationships through which control over social 
life could be effectively attained ought to be a handicap only for the positivist. 
But, comparative legal studies subscribes to a very different cognitive project. 
The comparative enterprise does not purport to be serviceable in the sense of 
providing an instrumental programme oriented toward technical ends…. 
comparative analysis of law is best apprehended as a hermeneutic investigation 
aiming to achieve understanding about the life of the law and life in the law 
through the invention of meaning.’89 
 
In line with the different methodologies that compete in the social sciences there 
is an important divide between those scholars who look for ‘indicators’ of legal 
culture in the activity of courts and other legal institutions, and those who insist 
instead on the need to interpret cultural meaning.90 The ﬁrst approach uses 
culture (or deliberately simpliﬁed aspects of it) to explain variation in matters 
such as levels and types of litigation or social control. In order to test its 
hypotheses the positivist approach is obliged to develop a socio-legal Esperanto 
which abstracts from the language used by members of different cultures, 
preferring for example to talk of 'decision- making' rather than 'discretion'. The 
rival strategy, concerned precisely with grasping linguistic subtleties and 
cultural packaging, would ask whether and when the term ‘discretion’ is used in 
different legal cultures and what implications the word carries91.For the 
interpretative approach, concepts both reflect and constitute culture; as in the 
changes undergone by the meaning of 'contract' in a society where the individual 
is seen as necessarily embodied in wider relationships 92, or the way that the 
Japanese ideogram for the new concept of 'rights' came to settle on a sign 
associated with 'self–interest’. rather than morality.93 Whereas the positivist 
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approach would seek to throw light on legal culture by seeking to assign causal 
priority between competing hypothetical variables so as to explain variation in 
levels and types of legally related behaviour, the interpretative approach, on the 
other hand, would be more interested in providing 'thick descriptions’ of law as 
'local knowledge'94. It would see its task as doing its best to faithfully translate 
another system's ideas of justice and fairness so as to make proper sense of its 
web of significance. It asks about the different nuances as between the terms 
'Rule of law',  'Rechtsstaat', or 'Stato di diritto' or the meanings of ‘community’ in 
different societies.95  
 
For many comparativists therefore, understanding is something that can only be 
reached through careful interpretation96. What does this legal institution, 
procedure or idea mean? What, if anything, is it trying to achieve? It could even 
be argued that by formulating their questions in this way scholars are more 
likely to be in tune with the many post- positivist schools of social science and 
cultural theorizing that have endorsed the so- called ‘interpretative turn’ away 
from earlier mainstream ways of pursuing behavioural science. Merry argues for 
an approach to culture that treats it as a way of seeing at least as much as an 
object of enquiry. She  argues that ‘notions of culture as residual cause or as 
holistic system have long since been rejected as inadequate. ‘Cultures’ she tells 
us,’ are not bounded entities but porous, sets of ideas and practices that are not 
fixed but constantly shifting. They provide the lens through which new 
institutions and practices are adopted and transformed. …This is a more 
dynamic, agentic, and historicized way of understanding culture. It emphasizes 
the active making of culture, society, and institutions and the grounding of this 
action in specific places and moments’. For her,’ what is essential is a framework 
that’ sees the cultural domain as a resource, a practice, and a dimension of 
institutions but not a residual cause.  Such a dynamic mode of analysis is a far 
more promising way to incorporate the dimensions of the cultural into the 
analysis of law/society relations than the holistic idea of legal culture.’ 97 
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For the Benda Beckmanns it is impossible to know how and when culture will be 
drawn on situationally. ‘Expectations, attitudes, knowledge and evaluation’ they 
say’ may be mutually interdependent. The knowledge or expectation of corrupt 
judges may be a reason to avoid state courts for certain persons while they at the 
same time cherish the idea of having a good law and legal procedure; for others 
it may be a reason to go there because they hope (or believe they know) that 
they may get away with things that would be impossible in village institutions of 
dispute settlement though that does not means that they have a high opinion of 
the law of the state.’They are especially concerned about the consistency of 
attitudes and behaviour across different contexts: 
‘we would have to distinguish between legal culture in the mind, in words, or in 
[concrete inter]action such as the making and justification of claims or 
judgments, where individual values and attitudes may be displayed quite 
differently. The statement made for public consumption, the declaration of a 
judgment according to the law in the name of the people, may express the judge’s 
values and attitudes towards law and legal procedure and may be manifest in a 
detailed rationalisation and justification. The same judge may have a cynical 
attitude towards the law when he has been bribed to let one party win and 
nevertheless writes a learned and sophisticated judgment, simply having shifted 
the onus of proof.’ 
 
The papers here that might seem to come nearest to offering tautologous 
explanations are those that make reference to national legal cultures as having 
the power to (re)shape the reception of legal reforms. But these authors are not 
offering the idea of Chinese or Japanese legal culture as causal mechanisms but 
rather are trying to provide a hermeneutic interpretation of one part of a 
(changing) legal whole  in relation to the rest. Palmer and Hotz seek to 
understand how ( and how far) the cultures they are studying  reconcile widely 
held ideals regarding the protection of women and children with their own well 
entrenched  long standing patriarchal legal cultures or ones which places the 
rights of the elderly before those of children. 
 
It would be wrong in any case to draw too sharp a line between explanation and 
interpretative understanding98. Even if she is cautious about positivist 
methodologies Merry still wants to know why the people she studied did or did 
not make use of the new legal institutions at their disposition. And Engel points 
to the need for comparative data. ‘If ‘hybridization’ in the nari adalat brought a 
greater promise of justice to village women in India, it seemed on the contrary to 
bring a diminished sense of access to fair treatment in northern Thailand.’ 
Kurkchiyan, too, though careful to define what she means by explanation does 
not abandon it. She argues that legal culture ‘is the product of a convoluted 
interplay between historical legacy, institutional performance and popular 
attitudes. ‘Such a broad picture’, she says,’ does not allow causal analysis, but it 
does have the potential to explain how law is embedded in the social texture and 
how it relates to other concepts such as justice, trust and the rule of law.’ Sezgin 
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offers us an account of the  wider conditions that explained the different 
outcomes of efforts to change Nigerian, Palestinian and Egyptian family law.But 
he is eager to generalise his findings, ‘The socio-legal change may then take place 
if the dominant legality is successfully replaced by an alternative image of 
legality, provided that, as three case studies have shown, a confluence of 
favourable political and institutional opportunity structures, support networks, 
and a repertoire of hermeneutic resources and interpretive schemas exist and 
are accessible to subaltern groups.’ 
 
Of Coherence and Change  
 
Another way of talking about the issues we have discussed so far, but also of 
taking them further, is to think about the alleged coherence of legal cultures and 
the way this relates to the possibilities of change. If aspects of law-in- society do 
come in ‘packages’ we need to ask what makes for the coherence (or ‘unity’) of  
such ‘units’? (How do elements turn into a whole? What  gives a unit its ’unity’?) 
The answer will also again depend on whether we treat coherence as an 
explanation or what needs to be explained ,99  as part of positivist explanation 
or as a hermeneutic alternative to it. Getting into detail a further set of questions 
concerns what it is that is being held together– individual opinions and attitudes, 
behaviours, texts, institutions, working groups, ideas and ideals? And by what? 
Psychological pressures to consistency, pressures for group conformity, 
institutional and organisational controls or routines, legal or religious texts?  
 
For many writers the idea of coherence provides the key to the point of talking 
about legal culture. It is this that ‘explains’ continuities in its patterns of ideas 
and practices over time, or that predicts how it is likely to respond to attempts at 
legal transfers. But for those critical of the concept of culture or legal culture the 
presumption of  coherence is the problem not the solution. Comparative lawyers 
and philosophers of law have often defined the term so as to capture the 
activities of the various legal professionals and jurists who bear the 
responsibility of (re)producing purported coherence in legal materials. 100But 
these writers say little about what type or degree of coherence is required in 
actual practice and their way of using the term can be somewhat narrow for 
many of the purposes of socio-legal inquiry. 101  
 
While, for some scholars, there is an intrinsic link between the elements that 
make up a given unit, others think that the connection exists (only) insofar as 
participants talk about it ‘as if’ it is real. For yet others the supposed coherence is 
one imposed on units by observers and commentators. On the one hand, it is 
argued that culture shapes action and ideas. On the other, if culture is, to a large 
extent, a matter of struggle and disagreement, the purported uniformity, 
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coherence or stability of given national or other cultures will often be no more 
than a rhetorical claim manipulated by members of the culture concerned or 
projected by outside observers.102 At the heart of this debate lies the question 
of whether coherence is an intrinsic or constructed feature of legal culture (and 
the process(es) by which one becomes the other). It is not only lawyers and 
judges, as Cotterrell tells us, who attempt to sell the ideology of law as a ‘gapless 
system’, whatever they may know from their everyday practice in their offices or 
in the courts. 103 As made clear in Silbey’s paper, lay actors also help to 
reproduce the idea that law must have an answer to all occasions of potential 
conflict. And even the Benda Beckmanns recognise that coherence does function 
as an ideal (or ideology) for those acting within these culture. As they put it ’ at 
the same time that which has been hybridized is also upheld practically in its 
idealized and allegedly original and uncontaminated form.’  
 
The range of possible positions is reflected also by the contributors to this 
special issue. Some authors assume that the task of showing that national legal 
cultures are in some ways coherent is just a matter of empirical demonstration, 
butt Field ìoffers a theoretical justification of this claim. Merry, by contrast,  sees 
legal culture as no more than a framework with different overlapping elements 
with no necessary overall coherence- little more than a series of  topics to 
investigate concerning institutions, attitudes, mobilisation and consciousness. 
For her, ‘Legal practices tend to be hybrid and creolized, formed of borrowings, 
transplants and translations of other legal practices in other places and times. 
Hence it is unlikely that will be coherent. Indeed as with culture more generally 
lack of coherence is what gives actors room for manoeuvre  and innovation’. For 
Saldias too, the only plausible coherence is one that allows for pluralism  ‘Just as 
it is possible to have more than one identity, it is possible to be immersed in 
more than one legal culture simultaneously.’ 
 
 The Benda-Beckmanns take a similarly sceptical view, telling us that : 
‘Minangkabau legal pluralism would consist of three legal orders, each with its 
own cultural dimension incorporating quite different and contradictory values 
and beliefs.’ For them this takes away the need to use the term at all. Silbey, who 
prefers the term legal consciousness (though is wary of reifying that too)  follows 
Swidler in seeing culture as ‘not a coherent, logical and autonomous system of 
symbols.104 Variation and conflict concerning the meaning and use of these 
symbols and resources is likely and expected because at its core, culture “is an 
intricate system of claims about how to understand the world and act on it”. 
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Under close scrutiny, doctrinally defined areas of law for example that governing 
family relations, seem to be far from coherent.105 On the other hand, it is 
important to distinguish speaking of coherence seen from within the culture and 
when offering external comparisons with other cultures. In these terms, the 
work of  family lawyers may have more in common with family lawyers in other 
jurisdictions and cultures than say copyright lawyers in the same country.106. 
And, seen cross- nationally, even apparently unconnected branches of law may in 
fact manifest remarkable levels of cultural similarity within a given society. As 
Whitman has claimed recently, in replying to criticisms of his ‘culturalist’ 
approach to penal law, ‘the pattern that we see in comparative punishment is 
also the pattern we see in many other areas of the law. Indeed, I would  claim it 
as a virtue of my book that it shows that punishment law cannot be understood 
in isolation from the rest of the legal culture. For example, American workplace 
harassment law differs from German and French workplace harassment law in 
very much the same way.. The same is true of comparative privacy law …just as it 
is true of the law of hate speech and everyday civility …I think these studies 
carry cumulative weight’. 107 
 
The question of what is meant by speaking of coherence gets even more complex 
if we examine the assumptions or claims that are made about ‘the fit’ between 
legal culture and other aspects of the same society.108 It is often assumed that 
the direction of influence is mainly from culture in general to legal culture in 
particular. Indeed this is the crux of Friedman’s argument. For him, sooner or 
later,  larger culture (re) shapes internal legal culture. Those who argue for so 
called constitutive theories of ‘law in society’ would see things also working the 
other way round109. But the existence of definite relationships between legal 
practices and ideas and those in the wider society does not mean that the one 
always and necessarily mimic the other. 110 
 In characterizing ‘the American way of law’ Kagan argues that this is the 
consequence of a ‘fundamental mismatch’ between, on the one hand, the demand 
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for social and political justice through law together with the expectations of 
equal opportunities demanded by interest groups and individuals, and, on the 
other hand,  where the role of central and local government is deliberately 
hamstrung, the difficulty of meeting these demands except piecemeal through 
the courts. 111. Moreover, places also differ in the extent to which similarities in 
legal and wider culture are valued. Thus, in places like Italy, an insistence on 
greater ‘formalism’ in legal matters may be understood as seeking to 
differentiate itself from the lack of such formalism in the ‘life world’ of ordinary 
social interaction.  
 
If legal culture does possess coherence how then does it also change? Ideas of 
continuity and change are inevitably reciprocally intertwined in debates about 
(legal) culture. 112 The strain towards supposed coherence is alleged to explain 
relative lack of change, the difficulty of change and even the direction of 
change113 . Conversely, claims that long-standing historical patterns cannot be 
altered can be ‘dystopic’ and block possible reforms114. Glenn claims that those 
who use culture as an explanation put too much stress on the past governing the 
present. 115It can be salutary to recall the transformations in attitudes towards 
‘law and order’ in the short period that elapsed from Weimar to Hitlerian 
Germany (and in an interconnected world even resistance to outside influence is 
an active process). But usually change is circumscribed. Consider again one of  
the examples mentioned earlier, that concerning scandals and legal culture. It is 
true that recently there have in fact been  expense scandals concerning members 
of parliament in England and Wales that have not been based round sexual 
improprieties. Equally there were attempts to bring down prime minister 
Berlusconi for alleged sexual misbehaviour. At the same time however it is 
interesting to note that the UK scandals concerned private misbehaviour by 
members of parliament rather than suspicion of business corruption of politics. 
Conversely, Berlusconi’s sexual mis(s) behaviour became a serious issue when it 
was seen to have involved the alleged facilitation of public works contracts to 
those who supplied him with  women. And in the end it was not these scandals 
that brought him down but unsustainable levels of public borrowing . 
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How far legal cultures can be deliberately transformed remains intensely 
controversial.116 Many of the contributors to this issue do underline continuity 
rather than or despite change. For Field ‘Italian reforms seem to innovate within 
established traditions rather than to challenge them’. Kurkchiyan tell us how 
much people’s expectations of legal institutions in Poland and Bulgaria remain 
similar to what they were before despite those countries joining the European 
Union. Palmer and Hotz find that law makers and law finders in China and Japan 
offer resistance to moving any faster to provide greater rights for women and 
children. As we have seen,  difficulties in knowing when such resistance will 
crumble puts in question the value of the term as a predictive device. For 
Ginsburg (explaining Friedman’s views) ‘Culture thus represents a kind of lag, 
though it is hardly predictable in the ways it changes. It is partly a constraint, but 
also partly a wild card, not capable of mechanistic analysis’. Field tells us that 
‘the ‘fit’ between Italian youth justice practices and Italian legal and general 
culture.. exactly implies the difficulty of making predictions about the 
consequences of applying similar practices in other social and legal contexts. 
Could or should some version of the Italian youth justice magistrate be 
introduced into England and Wales? It is conceivable that it might ‘work’, in the 
sense of producing outcomes judged positive for society or individuals within it, 
but it is very unlikely to work in the same way’.  
 
Saldias is much more confident about the possibility of engineered change and 
traces the stages by which legal change ends up producing a new coherence (at 
least at the level of rules). In the process of importing new ideas ‘members learn 
from each other how to behave in such networks, and they finally impose their 
behaviour and convictions to the newcomers, who usually reproduce the 
patterns primarily because they face “liability for their newness”. A 
consciousness develops in the sense that the laws that this networks advocate 
for, are a distinctive order, and they begin behaving accordingly’ . Thus ‘law 
transfer can originate all the necessary components of a slimmed-down legal 
culture,‘ and goes on,  ‘With the engagement of legal academia, the legal culture 
“light” is complete. It has become a community based on causal-beliefs about the 
role of the law, it has produced the necessary change, and it has crystallized 
them in binding case law.’  
 
Sezgin too (speaking about different types of change and different kinds of 
beneficiaries) offers us his roadmap of what must happen for successful change 
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to take place, ‘The constant struggle between the dominant and subaltern 
legalities is the driving engine of socio-legal change in the society. The change—
radical or incremental—can only be achieved when the dominant legality is 
successfully replaced by an alternative legality in the society. In this process of 
reproduction of legality subaltern groups will challenge the legitimacy of existing 
power relations and constantly offer new images and narratives of legality, 
through which they will redefine their rights and entitlements under the law. 
Oftentimes they will do that without necessarily altering the “law” or the “text” in 
question, but the legality built around it. ‘ 
 
On the other hand if culture is a toolkit (that social actors can choose when and 
how to draw on) how does it maintain its coherence? Silbey imoplies that, as in 
the classical sociologica debates, we do not have to come down on the side of 
either action or structure. She tells us here that  ‘…the system has no existence 
apart from the succession of practices that instantiate, reproduce, or - most 
interestingly - transform it. .. (S)system and practice constitute an indissoluble 
duality or dialectic.‘ In her account even lay people -by constructing intelligible 
and plausible claims to legal right out of discursive resources concerning ideas  
of labour, property, notice, and community consent- add new elements to law. 
Sezgin, writing about religious legal cultures, also takes the same approach. 
‘Individuals and groups’ he tells us ‘engage in construction of legality by drawing 
upon a particular strain of legal culture in the society. In other words, people can 
arrive at alternative versions of legality by invoking divergent strains of legal 
culture that consists of established ideas, religious precepts and teachings, social, 
cultural and moral postulates which both psychologically and axiologically 
influence the way people relate and react to the normative universe that 
surrounds them. Legal culture embodies various images and narratives of justice 
as well as interpretative schemas and resources (both allocative and 
authoritative) that not only give meaning to thought and action but also enable 
individuals to construct a self-sustaining holistic view of the legal and moral 
world by reimagining their own rights, entitlements, protections, obligations, 
restrictions, liabilities and disabilities under the law. Individuals participate in 
construction of legality through expression of their legal consciousness.’ 
 
Whatever culture represents at any given point can therefore change as a result 
of the ongoing actions (or inactions) of social actors. Saldias extends to this to 
the deliberate effort to reshape whole systems. Paradoxically their chance to 
transform other cultures reflects the strength of what unites their own 
professional cultures. As compared to the ‘thick culture that Geertz seeks to 
fathom, ‘he argues ‘what  holds together (‘light’) legal culture of legal actors  ‘can 
consist of policies and normative cores, an episteme, or a common academic or 
professional socialization. The actors involved ‘are interested in the outcome of 
legal transfers, and they share a belief about what particular laws are most 
beneficial for their communities, and how they should be implemented.’  
 
Can there be a universal concept of legal culture ? 
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The ability to change other places does not prove that we have understood them 
(it may often be a result of failing to do so). Assuming that we want to can we 
stand outside our own (legal) culture(s) in studying other (legal) cultures? How 
far is the idea of legal culture ( or at least any given conception of it) itself a ‘folk 
concept’ rather than an ‘observers’ concept? If there are obviously many legal 
cultures are her also multiple concepts of legal culture? Once again these 
questions are inseparable from the others we have been discussing. For example, 
they link to the question of what we take to be the ‘unit’ of legal culture (and who 
decides this) . Thus Glenn, for example, sees the idea of legal culture as linked to 
the Western idea of the state117. On one view of the aims of social science, 
propositions are strengthened the more they are shown to be valid across 
different cultures. It would count as an interesting finding about legal culture if 
we could show that courts are given the opportunity to assert themselves mainly 
when political parties are unsure whether they or their rivals will dominate.118 
The long standing rival conception of the ‘cultural sciences’, on the other hand, is 
cautious about such hypothesis testing. It insists that our understanding of other 
places will inevitably be coloured by our cultural starting point- and that our 
task is to revise this in the course of  learning about how things work elsewhere.  
 
Amongst our contributors, the Benda – Benda-Beckmannns stress the difficulty 
of applying the Western scholarly concept of legal culture for the purpose of 
explaining behaviour in plural legal systems where people can and do draw on 
different normative repertoires for different purposes. But they also argue that 
the problems they raise are not limited to such places– and that in many ways all 
jurisdictions are normatively plural.  Merry’s case- study is also of a plural and 
hybrid jurisdiction. But she takes this as an opportunity to test the limits of the 
concept and suggest ways to reformulate it to make it more broadly applicable. 
The most extended reference to the problem of universality, however, is found in 
Engel’s discussion of the ideas about ‘law’ and society’ that lie behind Friedman’s 
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categories of internal and external legal culture (ideas that are widely shared in 
mainstream work on  social science and law). 119 
 
There are problems, Engel tells us, in using this distinction even in western 
societies. Socio-legal scholars know very well that this sort of spatialization of 
law is a metaphor that may bear little relationship to law as it actually behaves 
and is experienced in everyday life. As he argues,‘ It is often difficult to say that 
any given person, event, or activity is inside or outside the law. Even within the 
solid walls of a courthouse, much activity takes place that could be considered 
‘outside’ the legal system’. 120But for him, Friedman’s idea of legal culture is 
especially unhelpful when dealing with countries with strong religious cultures 
such as Thailand. 121  
 
Instead of accepting Friedman’s own view of  internal and external legal culture 
as neutral analytical categories Engel instead offers a cultural reading of them.’ 
Two aspects of Friedman’s imagery’ he tells us, are particularly noteworthy.  
First, law is spatialized.  It has an inside and an outside, and legal culture forms a 
kind of membrane between the two spaces. Second, the internal space is dead, 
desiccated, and inert. It is a place of bones without flesh and words without life.  
By contrast, the external space is alive, vital, and active. Outside the law, one 
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finds life forces that act like water in the desert and bring to life the otherwise 
barren world of law.’ Referring by contrast to the approach taken by the noted 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz, Engel points to 'Friedman’s circumscribed view of 
law as a dusty, entombed skeleton versus Geertz’s broad and unbounded view of 
classical Indian law as sun and cattle! 'Friedman’s colourful imagery of law and 
legal culture’, he argues, ‘ presupposes a pluralism of legal and normative spaces, 
whereas Geertz’s description of Indian law presupposes the opposite – a unity of 
law, government, culture, and belief.’  
 
Whereas Friedman is seen as offering a value-free ‘scientific’ approach to legal 
culture,122 for Engel his concern with law having an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ is 
itself a reflection of the ‘project’ of modernity, aimed inter alia at securing liberal 
legalism and secularism. Friedman’s conception of legal culture is itself linked to 
the aspiration to keep politics and economics subservient to law as well as the 
value of civil society playing its proper role as the source of the legal. Maintaining 
the metaphorical separation of inside and outside, and thereby affirming the 
‘relative autonomy’ of law, is central to the project of modernity'. As compared to 
theocratic societies, this is crucial because the theory of modern law 
‘presupposes that no one group in the society has a privileged access to religion 
and moral truth,’ and therefore the proper role of law is to establish a secular 
and neutral ‘process for conflict resolution’ rather than to endorse one set of 
cultural practices or religious beliefs over another. ‘Engel thus accuses Friedman 
of being ethnocentric, parleying a local concept as if it was a general one. 
 
According to Ginsburg, on the other hand, Friedman is only speaking about the 
effects of ‘modernity’ on law and intends his ideas about legal culture to be 
applicable only to modern societies. As he puts it ‘Friedman argued that access to 
justice only becomes an issue when one accepts the peculiarly modern notion 
‘that there is, or ought to be, a single, uniform, universal body of norms; that 
every citizen—every man, woman, and child—regardless of rank, social status or 
income must be able to enjoy the protection and the privileges of that body of 
norms. Most law, in most times and places, has been hierarchical, and thus there 
is little demand for ‘access’ until a liberal regime starts to take hold.’ Likewise, 
his argument about the spread of a global legal culture is again an empirical 
claim (one subject to testing), a description of a trend towards convergence, not 
a normative ideal. His most recent book on the sociology of human rights 
stresses the role of modernity as the vector of social change. Even if there may be 
‘multiple modernities ‘for Friedman the similarities seen in  developments in the 
economy and infrastructure are more important than the differences. 123 
 
It is thus debatable how far Friedman’s distinction carries all the ‘liberal legalist’ 
implications that Engel attributes to it, especially given Friedman’s abiding 
concern  precisely to deny law’s autonomy so to show that it is what lies outside 
the law that actually animates and shapes it (as Engel himself concedes). What 
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Friedman does claim is the spread of common cultural ideas about individual 
rights – which law increasingly embodies in cross -national legal prescriptions. A 
sense of this process  can also be gained when reading the papers on China and 
Japan here which criticise the degree of protection of women and children 
currently offered in these jurisdictions. In part the authors tie their analyses to 
an ‘internal critique’ of what these legal systems claim to stand for. But they also 
hold them to ‘universal’ standards enshrined in international documents.  
 
The methods that these authors use are perhaps more legal than social scientific. 
But, for the student of legal culture, there may also be reasons to be cautious 
about apparently more ‘scientific’ forms of measuring progress towards 
compliance with human rights standards. Certainly, these  enterprises ( seek to) 
create as much as index common legal culture. As Sally Merry has written 
elsewhere, ‘Recent efforts to measure law and the rule of law by international 
financial institutions and NGOs such as the World Justice Project are currently 
grappling with …problems.. of incommensurability and a lack of data. They are 
also struggling with how to develop universal categories for comparison while 
recognizing the importance of local knowledge. ‘124 
 
So, as this suggests, we may also need to be cautious about the supposed 
universality of social science methods for studying legal culture when applied 
across different cultures. If  we do not make  allowance for cultural differences – 
for example with respect to expectations about saying and doing or the making 
and enforcing of laws -we can easily misinterpret our findings. In the case of the 
contributions to this volume we can ask what it means to say (as Hertogh does) 
that almost as many people in Italy as in the UK (86.9 %to 92.7%)  endorse the 
view that it is ‘not alright to break the law if you do not agree with it provided 
you are careful not to get caught’. Is this really a measure of legitimacy or an 
indication of what respondents thought they were supposed to say? Does it tell 
us what people believe should be the case or what they think is actually the case? 
Much turns on what the statement and the reply mean in different cultural 
contexts. Hertogh is careful to say that qualitative methods would be needed to 
supplement his survey research. But how the two types of approaches should be 
put together in such enquiries is another matter. 
 
Like other key sociological terms any characterization of culture can either 
attempt to keep analytical distance from or to grasp folk concepts. Susan Silbey 
and Patricia Ewick on the basis of their research in the USA have argued that 
legal consciousness refers to a limited set of narratives that ordinary Americans 
have about the law, which they characterize as “before the law”, “with the law”, 
and “against the law”.125 These represent three distinct schemas, or cognitive 
maps, through which individuals see themselves in the world. They are ways of 
understanding how the law works with relationship to the self. Any person may 
have more than one schema, deployed at different times depending on the 
situation. Whilst such an approach excites interest amongst scholars in 
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continental  jurisdictions a focus on studying legal consciousness bottom -up is 
currently less common there.126  Does this mean that looking for legal culture in 
public surveys itself presupposes a common law, bottom- up, approach to legal 
institutions?  
 
To this it could be replied that it can be illuminating to try out such an approach 
even where it  is less familiar. Blankenburg, as we have mentioned, in his well 
known comparison of Germany and the Netherlands downplayed the importance 
of ‘ folk’ legal consciousness assuming that popular culture and demands on law 
in both places would be similar127. Hertogh’s survey data reported here puts 
this assumption to the test and shows that are real differences between public 
attitudes in the two countries so that folk consciousness would seem to matter 
more than Blankenburg assumed. On the other hand, in her comparative study of  
a number of jurisdictions, Kurkchiyan’s research (in both common law and 
continental jurisdictions) provides evidence that different public expectations of 
the courts are themselves tied to what official ideologies tell them to expect. All 
this is proof, if any were needed, that we still have much to learn about what 
shapes and is shaped by legal culture.  
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